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Abstract: 
Scholars have argued that deindustrialization has had different effects on the 
occupational structure of South African cities. Some have argued for a polarisation of 
the occupational structure, where the decline of the manufacturing sector is argued 
to result in a loss of middle-income jobs. This is accompanied by large growth of 
employment in high-income and low-income jobs, resulting in an occupational 
structure bereft of middle-income jobs and polarised between classes of high-income 
and low-income workers. Others have argued for a professionalising pattern defined 
by the predominant growth of employment in highly-skilled, high-income managerial, 
professional, associate professional and technical jobs. In contrast to the growth of 
highly-skilled jobs is the stagnation or decline in growth of all other occupational 
groups, and rising unemployment. These changes in the occupational structure have 
also been argued to have specific consequences for persisting racial inequality. This 
study tests the aforementioned theories of occupational change by looking at the 
metropolitan municipality of eThekwini, which houses the city of Durban. It 
demonstrates that deindustrialisation in eThekwini is undergoing a pattern of middle-
income, semi-skilled growth that does not support the polarisation or 
professionalization hypotheses. It also produces evidence that does not support the 
argument that deindustrialisation results in an occupational structure polarised 
between a class of mostly white, highly-paid managers and professionals and a 
class of mostly black (black Africans, coloureds and Indians) low-paid service 
workers as the eThekwini middle-class is undergoing substantial de-racialisation. 
However, it argues that inter-racial inequality still persists due to the uneven high-
representation of whites in high-income jobs, opposed to the class of low-income 
workers and unemployed which are almost entirely dominated by black Africans. 
Alongside this is a pattern of deepening intra-racial inequality between the growing 
black African middle-class, and the class of black Africans which dominate the 
unemployed. 
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Chapter 1:  
Introduction, Literature Review and Hypotheses 
Cotemporary South Africa is beset with vast inequalities, affecting many areas of life 
from economic, political, social and geographic spheres. However, how best to deal 
with issues of inequality is a significant challenge and how to understand and 
analyse them is not always clear, resulting in uncertainty and contention. A notable 
example of contention and debate over inequality in contemporary South Africa is 
the city, and the experiences of urban inequality. Scholars have argued that the 
deindustrialization of the global economy has had varied effects on the occupational 
structure of global cities, a debate which is also taking place within the context of 
South Africa. Some of these effects have been argued to be the growth in 
employment of high-income professionals and low-income service-sector workers, 
resulting in social polarization, or the increasing growth of high-income, skilled work 
resulting in professionalization of the workforce. Further debate has ensued over the 
accompanying social effects of deindustrialization and the changing class structure, 
with emphasis on the changing spatial dynamics of cities or the increasing role of 
low-skilled immigration. In the South African context the relationship between race 
and urban inequality has received particular focus, that the persistent racial 
inequality in our major cities is caused by deindustrialization, which has led to high 
unemployment along racial lines and an occupational structure defined by a 
polarization into a class of predominantly white, high-income managers and 
professionals and a class of almost exclusively black, low-income service sector 
workers. In contrast, other scholars have argued for the professionalization of the 
occupational structure, where an increasingly racially-mixed middle class co-exists 
with a black working class and spatially isolated neighbourhoods characterized by 
high-unemployment.  
Research looking at this debate, such as studies by Lemanski, Beavon, Turok, 
Crankshaw and Borel-Saladin have primarily looked at the cities of Johannesburg 
and Cape Town, as these are South Africa’s largest cities and ranked highest within 
the Global City Index, both holding positions as “Emerging Cities”. The argument that 
deindustrialization leads to social polarization is made by Lemanski (2007), who 
used Cape Town as the basis of her study. The basis of this argument is that the 
economies of cities has shifted from an industrial structure to one dominated by 
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service sector jobs, which has created a polarized pattern of employment growth that 
entails the growth of high-income managerial and professional jobs, but also large 
growth of low-income service jobs. This is accompanied by a significant decline in 
the manufacturing jobs which traditionally were the base of semi-skilled middle-
income work. This absolute growth at the top and bottom ends of the occupational 
structure observed in deindustrialized cities has resulted in “social polarization”, 
which Lemanski argues is evident in Cape Town, with absolute growth in highly-
skilled and low-skilled jobs, on the one hand, and a decline in semi-skilled, middle-
income employment on the other hand.  Additionally, scholars such as Turok (2001) 
and Beavon (2005) have argued that cities like Johannesburg and Cape Town are 
experiencing a spatial polarization, where deindustrialization has affected the 
occupational structure in a way that is creating racially segregated neighbourhoods. 
These areas are socially divided between poor, working class blacks who live in 
townships which are displaced from the growing service sector, which is booming in 
middle-class suburban residential neighbourhoods. These spatial effects and the 
persisting racial inequality could be argued to be evidence of the effects of social 
polarization. 
A different side to the debate is argued by Crankshaw and Borel-Saladin. Studies on 
Cape Town by Crankshaw (2012) and Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw (2009) and on 
Johannesburg (Crankshaw, 2008; Crankshaw and Borel-Saladin, 2014) have argued 
that Cape Town and Johannesburg are not experiencing absolute polarization as 
there is not a polarized growth between high and low-skilled jobs. Instead, they 
argue that these cities are experiencing a professionalization which is characterized 
by the large growth of high-income, highly-skilled managerial and professional jobs, 
resulting in a dramatic growth of the professional and managerial middle-class. 
Additionally, they also argue that there is increasingly a general upgrading of the 
skills and income of the employed workforce. While such an argument does agree 
that there has been a decline in semi-skilled, middle-income manufacturing work, 
they disagree with proponents of the polarization thesis that the growth in the service 
sector has been between highly-skilled, high-income jobs and low-skilled, low-
income work. Instead, Crankshaw and Borel-Saladin (2014) argue that the Greater 
Johannesburg area is home to a growing class of well-paid, non-manual service 
workers, such as white-collar semi-skilled clerical and sales jobs, who cannot be 
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characterized within the low-income bracket of occupations. This growth of semi-
skilled jobs was also greater than that of low-skilled employment, which is not 
evident of a polarizing pattern. This professionalization is also characterized by 
growing unemployment, as there is a class of unemployed workers who cannot find 
jobs due to the decline of unskilled manufacturing work and growth of skilled service-
sector jobs. This is argued to create inequality that is characterized by social 
divisions between several employed classes by their incomes, and a growing class 
of the unemployed as well.  
This debate also has important consequences in terms of racial inequality in South 
Africa as well, as the changing nature of urban occupational structures will have an 
impact on racial inequality. If we follow the social polarization thesis advanced by 
scholars like Lemanski (2007) in her study of Cape Town then Cape Town’s 
increasing role as a global city and the decline of manufacturing jobs is maintaining 
racial inequality within the spatially divided city. As argued by Turok (2001) there is a 
gulf between the poor townships and wealthier areas and this spatial gap could be 
reinforced by market forces, which then isolate the poor from areas where they 
would be able to find jobs. Arguments like those by Lemanski are similar to those 
made by scholars in favour of the social polarisation hypothesis who argue that 
polarisation is also producing racial inequality. The workforce is argued to be 
polarising racially, with non-whites concentrated in low-skilled, low-income service 
jobs and whites who are concentrated in well-paid and highly-skilled managerial and 
professional jobs (Baum 1997; 1999; Harrison and Bluestone 1988, 70; Sassen 
1990, 83-4; Sassen 1998, 46; Sassen 2001, 321).  
Scholars who argue for professionalization agree that deindustrialisation and the 
growth of service-sector employment has increased racial inequality due to blacks 
(black Africans, Coloureds and Asians/Indians) bearing the brunt of middle-income 
job losses in the manufacturing sector. They also agree that the better-educated 
white population has benefitted from the growth of highly-skilled and highly-paid 
managerial and professional and technical work. However, those in favour of 
professionalization argue that racial inequality is further increased by growing 
unemployment which is resulting in greater unemployment rates for low-skilled 
blacks than those found amongst better-educated whites (Kasarda, 1989: 33; 
Kesteloot, 1995: 211-14; Kesteloot, 2000: 199-201; Ortiz, 1996; Wilson, 1980; 
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Wilson 1987, 39-41; Wilson, 1996: 30). In the South African context, this is also 
argued to be producing increasing intra-racial inequality. As more black Africans are 
gaining the skills and education to be employed in well-paid, highly-skilled jobs, there 
is a contrast with the growing number of black Africans who remain unemployed. 
Scholars like Crankshaw (2008; 2012) argue that the middle class in both Cape 
Town and Johannesburg is becoming deracialized but that the increasing 
unemployment (partly the result of the professionalizing occupational structure) is 
creating a large class of unemployed who are almost exclusively black. Similar 
arguments are made by Seekings and Nattrass (2005) and Seekings (2001; 2011) 
about increasing intra-racial inequality in contemporary South Africa as the large 
number of unemployed black Africans are argued to form part of an “underclass”. 
This underclass consists of households entirely bereft of any working members, thus 
lacking both skills and social capital. In a market where there is a decline in low-
skilled work and growing demand for skilled employment, social connections are 
crucial and those households which lack both skills and social connections will be at 
risk for unemployment. Such an underclass of unemployed black Africans is likely to 
grow in the conditions of deindustrialisation; a stark contrast to those who have the 
skills to benefit from the growing service sector. 
eThekwini:  
Aside from these studies of Cape Town and Johannesburg there have not been 
further intensive studies of the changing occupational structure and the effects of 
deindustrialization within other urban contexts in South Africa. This is 
understandable as not many South African cities are large enough to fit into the 
global city context. A logical further study would be the city of Durban which is, along 
with Johannesburg and Cape Town, one of South Africa’s largest cities and is the 
focal point of the large Kwazulu-Natal province (Morris, Barnes & Dunne, 2001). This 
study will look at the entire Metropolitan Municipality of eThekwini, which includes 
the city of Durban and the surrounding towns like Umdloti and Verulam, and aim to 
analyse the changing occupational class structure and how these changes have also 
affected racial inequality within the city. Historically, the city was shaped by being a 
port-city, one which is one of the largest coastal trading ports on the African 
continent. The position on the East African coast is also significant, as it serves as a 
gateway to Asia and trade with other large economies like India. Spurred on by the 
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trade-power of the harbour, the city has a history as a manufacturing hub, with the 
production and exporting of goods being the focus of eThekwini’s economy for 
decades. Morris, Barnes and Dunne (2001) argue that in the early 2000’s 30% of 
eThekwini’s GDP came from manufacturing, with food, automotive and clothing 
industries dominating the economy. Prinsloo (1996) argues that alongside the 
Western Cape clothing industry, eThekwini is responsible for the bulk of South 
Africa’s clothing manufacturing, with several clothing firms competing in a massive 
local clothing sector. The large role of manufacturing in the city’s economy also led 
to a large reliance on either semi-skilled machine operators, such as in the clothing 
industry (Prinsloo, 1996:7) or in unskilled labour employed in elementary 
occupations, such as stevedoring or longshoreman working at the docks (Dubbeld, 
2003). This status as a large, growing manufacturing dominated city will make for an 
interesting urban environment to study if deindustrialization is taking place. Of 
particular note will be how observations of the city’s changing occupational structure 
relate to theories of urban polarization and professionalization.  
It will also be of interest to see how the racial composition of the occupational 
structure has changed, and if the evidence presented supports contemporary 
arguments about race and class in South Africa, particularly regarding persisting 
racial inequality. A pre-1994 study of the whites-only eThekwini neighbourhood of 
Albert Park (Maharaj and Mpungose, 1994) examined the “greying” of the 
neighbourhood and traces the arrival of black Africans into the area since the 1980’s, 
making a case for racial desegregation in the city. Studies by Kitchin (2002) and 
Morris and Hindson (1997) also look at the history of the city’s spatial segregation 
and how recent decades have seen the gradual de-racialisation of the middle class, 
alongside increasing intra-racial inequality. In a more recent study, Schensul and 
Heller (2011) use what they call a sociological cartographical approach to determine 
how inequality exists spatially in the city in terms of race and class and how this 
urban distribution affects eThekwini’s development. They argue for three emerging 
kinds of neighbourhoods: firstly, one that is mono-racial, socially isolated and 
impoverished. Secondly, there are neighbourhoods which are racially diverse with 
economic opportunities that may or may not also have a variation in class as well. 
Finally, they argue that “transformed” neighbourhoods are also emerging that are 
diverse across racial and class lines and are economically articulated. Apart from 
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how these arguments may reveal a possible relationship between the spatial 
composition of the city and deindustrialization, insight into the specific geographical 
and historical compositions of the city will be useful in understanding the historical 
background of this specific case study. 
eThekwini and Racial Inequality Under Apartheid: 
It is also necessary to go into some historical detail of the racial dynamics in 
eThekwini and how Apartheid shaped racial inequality. In the aisles of history, the 
policies of the Apartheid government stand out as some of the most extreme 
attempts of social engineering in the 20th century. Policies which divided the 
populace into racial groups which were placed onto a social hierarchy created 
exceptional opportunities for the life-chances for those who benefited from the 
Apartheid system, namely the white population. Those who experienced 
discrimination by the social hierarchy created by Apartheid, such as black, Indian 
and coloured South Africans, had their life-chances drastically reduced. As this study 
is looking at changes experienced by a city, it is logical to briefly detail some of the 
ways which the policies of Apartheid impacted urban racial inequality. Due to laws 
like the Group Areas Act, cities experienced severe urban segregation, which 
combined with policies preventing inter-racial marriage or sex, limited the possibility 
of racial assimilation or crossing racial boundaries (Seekings, 2011:532). Residential 
segregation was also regulated, with areas designated to specific racial groups, 
which in combination with policies over influx control such as the pass system, 
limited where black Africans could live and work. The designated areas for blacks 
were limited to small and poor housing in planned townships, which were not only 
removed from the Apartheid city, but were ideal fostering grounds for the 
development of unemployment (Seekings,2011: 533). 
These racial divisions were not purely geographic and also extended to matters of 
income. Seekings and Nattrass (2005) argue that racial discrimination affected 
incomes directly, with white and black people who had the same qualifications and 
jobs being paid different wages, particularly in public sector jobs. For example, the 
starting salary for a black African nurse was only two-thirds of what was paid to a 
white nurse with the same qualifications (Seekings and Nattrass, 2005: 2).Such 
racial discrimination present in income extended to school teachers and police 
constables who were paid half as much as their white counterparts, and to black old-
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age pensioners who received substantially less pensions from the state than old-age 
whites. The social engineering of racial inequality was further entrenched by the role 
of segregated and unequal education during Apartheid. Separate education systems 
were developed for whites, coloureds, Asians/Indians and black Africans which 
stretched from primary to tertiary education (Johnson, 1982: 214). These different 
forms of education by race were grossly unequal, with white children having free 
access to schooling, textbooks and the best quality education available. The “Bantu” 
education created for black African children was neither free, nor compulsory and 
progressing to secondary school forced them to learn in either English or Afrikaans, 
neither which most black African children were proficient in (Johnson, 1982: 221). 
Finally, this form of school was of extraordinary low quality, created to preserve the 
social divisions of Apartheid by educating black Africans in a way that would 
preserve their economic and social place in being sub-ordinate to whites (Johnson, 
1982: 221-222). The combination of limited opportunities on the basis of race, 
dispossession from property, vastly unequal wages and poor education resulted in 
substantial racial inequality, which would limit the social and economic mobility of 
black Africans during both the Apartheid and post-Apartheid years. 
The particular ethnic and racial make-up in eThekwini is quite unique when 
compared to the broader South African context. The Kwazulu-Natal province has, as 
the name suggests, historically been the home of a large group of South Africa’s 
Zulu-speaking population, with local political parties such as the Inkatha Freedom 
Party long being a representation of the province’s Zulu-speakers (Moffet and 
Freund, 2004:139). The eThekwini area has also accommodated other members of 
South Africa’s black African population.  The white population is made-up primarily of 
first-language English speakers, and not those who speak Afrikaans; Afrikaners are 
a smaller minority in the population of both eThekwini and the Natal province than in 
the rest of the country (Moffet and Freund, 2004:138). Perhaps the most glaring and 
unique feature of eThekwini’s racial population is the large presence of a population 
of Indian-descent that is particularly concentrated within the city. The presence of 
Indians is so large within Durban itself that there are estimates that eThekwini 
accounts for 60 percent or more of South Africa’s entire Indian population (Moffet 
and Freund, 2004:138). This has led to the Indian population of eThekwini having a 
large role in the commercial and industrial development of the city, argued by Moffet 
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and Freund (2004) to have also formed part of eThekwini’s social elite structure. 
How exactly the Indian population has been represented in the different occupational 
groups over the last four and a half decades will be interesting in how they compare 
to other racial groups as they too experienced discrimination under the policies of 
Apartheid. If the Indian population has formed part of the social elite in eThekwini, 
this should show in their representation in the better-paid and higher-skilled 
occupational groups. How the Indian population as a whole has developed since 
1994 in comparison to the black population will also be of interest: has there been 
equal development of skills in both racial groups over time? Have both groups made 
similar inroads in moving out of unskilled jobs and unemployment? 
Residentially, eThekwini, most of the Durban CBD and the surrounding suburbs, 
such as Umhlanga Rocks, were white areas while the urban townships designated 
for black Africans were areas like Umlazi, Ntuzuma and Inanda (Schensul and 
Heller, 2011: 84). Following the end of Apartheid, there are several obvious 
questions in relation to the dismantling of the Apartheid city: firstly if previously 
whites-only areas are becoming deracialised, and if black Africans who previously 
were trapped in poor townships have gained greater social and economic mobility. 
While there are examples, such as Maharaj’s and Mpungose’s (1994) study of the 
deracialising or “greying” of Albert Park, of decreasing inter-racial inequality the 
question remains just how much racial inequality is decreasing. In addition, if there is 
upward social mobility among middle-class blacks, how does it compare to 
increasing unemployment for poor black Africans? Such questions of inter and intra 
racial inequality are important for this study. 
Origins of the Occupational Structure Debate: 
The origins of the debate around the changing of urban occupational structures can 
be traced back to the “Social Polarisation” thesis, most famously used by Saskia 
Sassen in The New Inequalities in Cities (1994). Sassen is also well-known for 
developing the argument about the modern “Global City”: international command 
centres for transnational corporations (Sassen, 1994: 107). Sassen argues that the 
changing economies of cities has shifted from an industrial structure to one 
dominated by service sector jobs, which has created a polarized pattern of 
employment growth that entails the growth of high-income managerial and 
professional jobs, but also the large growth of low-income service jobs. This is 
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accompanied by a significant decline in the manufacturing jobs which traditionally 
were the base of semi-skilled middle-income work. This absolute growth at the top 
and bottom ends of the occupational structure observed in deindustrialized cities has 
resulted in “social polarization” (Sassen, 1994: 107).  Sassen further argues that the 
resultant inequality in cities takes on a geographical form as well; less-skilled 
workers are concentrated in the run-down areas of the housing market often within 
inner-city neighbourhoods. Due to the large amount of immigration to large cities like 
New York and Los Angeles, Sassen argues that minority racial and ethnic groups 
are concentrated in low-income jobs (Sassen, 1994: 116-117). Following on 
Sassen’s social polarization thesis, is a study by Chui and Lui (2004) looking at Hong 
Kong’s changing occupational structure since the 1990’s. Chui and Lui argue that 
Hong Kong’s transformation from a port and colony dominated by industry to a 
Chinese global city driven by producer services resulted in social polarization. This is 
useful to the proposed study as not only does it provide scholarly evidence of a 
decline in manufacturing jobs and an application of Sassen’s theory, but Hong Kong 
is also a port city which though much larger, can possibly be compared to eThekwini. 
The alternate professionalization argument was most notably raised by Hamnett, 
who argues that Sassen’s polarization thesis does not apply to all global cities, 
despite her effective analysis of New York and Los Angeles (Hamnett, 1994: 401). 
He instead argues that there is an occupational professionalization taking place by 
producing evidence from the Randstad in Holland and London in the United Kingdom 
which is characterized by the large growth of high-income, highly-skilled managerial 
and professional jobs, resulting in a dramatic growth of the professional middle class. 
In addition to this growing professional and managerial middle class (which is not 
defined as the “middle class” of blue-collar middle-income jobs, a definition used by 
most American scholars) there is a general growth of skilled jobs across the 
occupational structure. However, the growth of professional and managerial jobs is 
much greater than the growth in other jobs and in addition to this, there is a decline 
in unskilled work and also growing unemployment (Hamnett, 1994: 411) 
(Hamnett, 2003). The increasing education level of the population and increasing 
demand for service sector white-collar semi-skilled and highly-skilled work leads 
those who are uneducated or whom previously depended on blue-collar semi-skilled 
work, to be at risk of unemployment (Hamnett, 1994:413). These semi-skilled jobs 
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were largely found in the manufacturing sector, which as a result of 
deindustrialization are declining in number.  In addition to arguing for a different 
outcome of deindustrialization on urban occupational structures, Hamnett also seeks 
to identify why the results from cities like New York and Los Angeles produce the 
polarisation effect argued for by Sassen, which he argues could be down to high 
levels of low-skilled immigration. 
The Research Questions: 
When specifying the research question, and how it relates to the research design, 
there is a sense of theory testing to it: I aim to analyse the changes of eThekwini’s 
occupational structure, and particularly if deindustrialization is taking place. To do 
this, I will need to firstly determine if the manufacturing sector is declining. Theories 
of social polarization and professionalization both argue for particular patterns of 
growth of urban occupational structures, so I will be able to test these theories by 
comparing them to the results of this study. Finally, I will also be able to test theories 
about how the deindustrialization of the occupational structure in global cities is 
affecting racial inequality. A prediction would be that eThekwini will be experiencing 
deindustrialization in that there is a decline in the manufacturing sector and manual 
jobs, on one hand, and a substantial growth in service sector jobs, on the other.  
That being said, the aim will not be to purely test theory but also to measure the 
changes in the distribution of occupations which could present some original and 
unique findings within this debate. If the results are unlike anything that the theories 
of social polarization or professionalization suggest, this study could be used to build 
theory too. De Vaus (2001) argues that a difference between building theory and 
testing theory can be that the logic behind building a theory is inductive, as the 
theory is developed after observations are made and attempt to make sense of what 
was observed. As we aim to measure the spread of occupations of eThekwini’s 
workforce and how it has changed over a period of time, there will be an inductive 
logic to how we make sense of the results. However, I will need to review previous 
studies on the debate to familiarise myself with the different perspectives and results. 
The results and arguments made by other studies could influence how I approach 
the questions of whether eThekwini is experiencing deindustrialization and if the 
occupational structure is becoming polarized or professionalized. Such influence 
could bring elements of prediction into play as we test the conclusions of other 
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positions within the debate and thus I could simply try to replicate the results I most 
agree with; leading to a more deductive form of logic. My aim is not to purely 
replicate the results and arguments of previous studies but also to look at the 
research questions and issues concerning the debate through the lens of the 
particular context of eThekwini. If the results are different from or offer a fresh take 
on predominant theories, then these theories may need to be modified or rejected, in 
which case I could build new theory from observations which are different to what 
both proponents of social polarization and professionalization or claiming. It is also 
important to note that these arguments can be swayed by how the different 
economic occupations and sectors are conceptualized in the literature. Studies have 
produced results arguing for social polarization as they have conceptualized clerical, 
sales and service jobs as low-income service jobs when the evidence shows that the 
income of these clerks, sales and service workers is closer to manufacturing workers 
which are classified as middle-income, than the low-income bracket they are 
assumed to be in (Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw, 2009) To avoid potentially skewing 
results, I will have to clearly define how the research intends to conceptualize and 
define the different occupations and their related economic sectors. 
In summarising the research questions below, it is possible to formulate several 
initial hypotheses and link them to the listed questions from the theories regarding 
the effect of deindustrialization on the occupational structure, and how this has 
affected racial inequality: 
1) Firstly, is eThekwini experiencing deindustrialization in regards to 
employment? The related hypothesis would be that eThekwini is experiencing 
a decline of employment in the manufacturing sector. Such a decline could be 
absolute, where the number of workers employed in the manufacturing sector 
decrease, or a relative, where the rate of increase in manufacturing jobs and 
the total share of the workforce employed in manufacturing declines relative to 
the growth of other economic sectors.   
2) Secondly, is eThekwini experiencing occupational polarisation? A hypothesis, 
related to the polarisation argument, is that eThekwini will be experiencing 
absolute polarization, with large absolute increases in the number of high and 
low-income service jobs accompanying an absolute decrease in middle-
income manufacturing work. A rival hypothesis would be that eThekwini could 
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instead be experiencing professionalization in that there is dramatic absolute 
growth in highly-skilled, high-income managerial, professional and technical 
jobs, and the absolute decline or stagnation of other occupational groups. 
Present alongside this professionalization of the occupational structure would 
be growing unemployment for those deprived of skills required for semi-skilled 
or highly-skilled jobs. 
3) What are the changes of employment in eThekwini? Is the unemployment rate 
increasing? A hypothesis in accordance to the professionalization argument 
would predict that it is. 
4) How do the arguments about the effect of social polarisation on racial 
inequality hold up in the case of the city of eThekwini? As argued by 
Lemanski (2007: 457) deindustrialization has created a polarisation that takes 
on a racial form, with whites dominating the better-paid and more skilled jobs 
in comparison to black African, Coloured and Indian workers who, due to the 
decline of middle-income working class jobs, are further cut off from being 
employed in middle-income and high-income work. Such a hypothesis 
predicts that black African workers will predominantly be employed in low-
income jobs, with few black Africans employed in middle-income and high-
income jobs. A rival hypothesis to this would be, as argued by Crankshaw 
(2012: 849), that the mobility of black African, Indians and Coloureds into 
middle-income and high-income jobs, has resulted in the de-racialisation of 
eThekwini’s middle class. 
 
Important questions that this study will not look at are (a) the relationship between 
changes in the occupational structure and the growing feminisation of the workforce, 
(b) the relationship between changes in the occupational structure and 
intergenerational occupational mobility and (c) the causes of unemployment and 
deindustrialization within the context of eThekwini. With my analysis looking at 
eThekwini over a period of several decades, changes in the occupational structure 
and racial composition should be evident; the results and patterns over time in the 
city should allow me to make a substantive contribution to the debate around urban 
inequality. 
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Chapter 2:  
Research Methods and Methodology 
When considering how to approach the research questions, we must consider the 
nature of the debate around urban inequality in South Africa in regards to the 
changing occupational structure and how this is argued to be affecting both social 
and racial inequality in society. Hence, we must look carefully at the logic of the 
specific arguments regarding the debate, starting with those who argue in favour of 
social polarization, such as work by Sassen (1991; 1994), Friedman and Wolf (1982) 
and then considering arguments for professionalization made by Hamnett (1994; 
2003), Levy (1987) and Clarke (1993). Firstly, we can gain a good sense of the 
polarization argument and its logic by looking at Sassen’s work. She argues that 
there is a shift in the economies of cities, as there are significant numerical changes 
in the economic sectors, which has resulted in occupational and income polarisation. 
The first of these changes is self-evident when describing the concept of 
“deindustrialization”:  she argues that the number of industrial, manufacturing jobs 
has decreased significantly, and in contrast there has been large growth in service 
sector employment. This is not merely an argument about decreasing numbers 
within one sector and growth in another, but also how jobs that are assumed to 
belong to specific income-levels are changing.  Firstly, the argument is concerned 
with how deindustrialization has resulted in the decline of manufacturing jobs that 
were full-time contractually protected by trade unions (Sassen, 1994: 106). These 
declining jobs are argued to have been formal middle-income jobs such as skilled 
craftsperson’s and trade workers or semi-skilled plant and machine operators and 
assemblers. The remaining jobs in the manufacturing sector are argued to 
increasingly being downgraded to casual, part-time manufacturing jobs that offer low 
wages: such as jobs in sweatshops.  
In contrast, the growing service sector is argued to be polarized between the growth 
of highly-skilled, high-income managerial, professional, associate professional and 
technical jobs and low-skilled, low-income personal service jobs. The growth of the 
service sector employment takes on the form of an hourglass, where the numbers of 
jobs are either at the top (high-income) or at the bottom (low-income), with middle-
income jobs argued to have declined the most (Marcuse, 1989:699). In regards to 
my methodology, this argument is making quantitative claims, as the logic is based 
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upon the changing numbers of the occupational structure, the numerical decline of 
manufacturing and growth of the service sector, and how this has affected the 
number of available jobs within particular income brackets. The arguments made by 
scholars who are in favour of professionalization are also quantitative in nature. 
Scholars like Levy (1987), Bell (1973) and Hamnett (1994 ; 2003) argue that large 
cities are seeing increasing demand for highly-skilled workers that is leading to 
dramatic growth of employment in highly-skilled, high-income managerial, 
professional and technical jobs, leading to creation of a large professional and 
managerial middle class. In comparison, growth in other occupations is declining or 
stagnating. As this argument claims that there is such a substantial growth in these 
particular highly-skilled jobs, it too is making a numerical claim about where and how 
much the employed workforce is changing. As the demand for skills in the workforce 
grows, those who are unskilled are at greater risk of unemployment, which pro-
professionalization scholars argue is also increasing. Both the polarization and 
professionalization arguments are based on the changing numbers of the 
occupational structure and measuring where these changes are happening; thus a 
quantitative approach is logical for my study.  
This discussion on the quantitative nature of the debate around the changing 
occupational structure can further be linked to the philosophy behind quantitative 
approaches and how the logic of this particular incarnation of the scientific method 
works. The aim of science is often argued to be the generation of objective 
knowledge of our reality through observation, which can then be replicated and 
ultimately be generalized from one case study of a phenomenon to many, or in some 
cases, all.  As argued by Sayer, a key feature of quantitative approaches to research 
is generalization: as such research attempts to gain an approximate measure of a 
number of phenomena in a population which may belong to the same class or 
descriptive property (Sayer, 1992: 100).  What this entails for a study like this is that 
the results of quantitative estimates from sample surveys or from censuses can then 
be generalized to the population. A successful use of such quantitative methods will 
allow me to make observations about the real population of eThekwini that is related 
to the research questions detailed in chapter 1. Additionally, an aim is to produce 
results which could further be compared to other studies, replicated and ideally 
achieve some level of standardization. Studies like those by Sassen (1984), 
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Hamnett (1994; 2001), Lemanksi (2007), Crankshaw (2008; 2009) and Chiu and Lui 
(2004) demonstrate how the logic behind a quantitative approach works. In this case, 
deindustrialization (the declining manufacturing sector and growth of the service 
sector) has been argued to be the cause of social polarization, and has thus also 
been seen as an explanation for urban inequality. This kind of causal explanation is, 
as deemed by Sayer (1992: 127), “instrumentalist” as it is not referring to an actual 
causal mechanism which has produced the changes in the occupational structure. 
Instead, this explanation is referring to the statistical effects that are created by 
numerical changes, in this case referring to how the statistical distribution of service 
sector occupations is argued to be more polarised than those in the manufacturing 
sector. The increase in the size of the former and the decrease in the size of the 
latter ‘causes’ the overall occupational structure to take on a polarized form. The 
concept of causation used here is therefore not implying a causal social mechanism 
that has directly produced urban inequality; instead, it describes the overall statistical 
effect of the changing occupational distributions in major economic sectors. 
It may also be useful to consider the logic of falsification proposed by Karl Popper 
here, who argues that scientific knowledge and theories cannot be proven to be true, 
but instead theories or general claims can be proven to be false (Williams and May, 
1996: 29). Rigorous study of particular claims and theories can lead to different 
results, which may test and build on the library of scientific knowledge by falsifying 
some of the original theory’s claims. I could apply such thinking to all the studies that 
have tested Sassen’s theory of social polarization, and particularly those that have 
produced different results and questioned the general claim of social polarization in 
cities, such as Hamnett’s professionalization theory.  In order to test these results in 
a wider sense and to critically evaluate the debate around the changing urban 
occupational structure, it would be logical to use a similar quantitative approach to 
measure the changes in a city’s occupational structure, to test if deindustrialization is 
taking place, and if the occupational structure is as polarized between high-income 
and low-income jobs as proponents of social polarization claim. In regards to this 
study, I can compare eThekwini’s results to the other South African studies done by 
Lemanski (2007), Crankshaw (2008; 2009) and Crankshaw and Borel-Saladin 
(2014), observing if eThekwini is becoming polarized or professionalized. I will also 
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be able to empirically test theories regarding racial inequality by measuring the racial 
composition of eThekwini’s employed workforce and it’s unemployed over time. 
To measure the changes of eThekwini’s occupational structure, the number of 
employed workers and the racial composition of the employed workforce over time, 
this study will make use of questionnaire-survey data, similar to the other studies 
discussed in chapter one. It is therefore necessary to be familiar with the logic of 
probability sampling, which is utilized in large scale questionnaires surveying the 
population, such as the Labour Force Surveys. Moser and Kalton (1971) argue that 
probability sample surveys have two noted objectives: to firstly estimate the 
quantities of specific population parameters and secondly to test statistical 
hypotheses regarding a population. The logic of a probability sample is that each unit 
of the sample has a chance, a known non-zero probability, of being included in that 
sample (Levy and Lemeshow, 1999:20). Each of the units can only be selected once 
and as the selection for each unit of the sample has a known probability of being 
selected it is possible to get an unbiased sample (Fink, 2003: 11). 
In this study I have made use of earlier South African Census data (which are full 
counts of the whole population) and the Labour Force Surveys, which are samples 
drawn from the population. The LFS samples are based on data collected from the 
2001 census, which divided the country into 80,787 enumeration areas (Stats SA, 
2013: 1). The LFS’s also make use of the Stats SA household surveys which use a 
Master sample of Primary Sampling Units (PSU), which comprise the enumerator 
areas that were drawn from all the enumeration areas of the country. The LFS 
samples are designed to be statistically representative at provincial and metropolitan 
levels, and further within urban and rural geography types relative to each 
metropolitan area. This was fitting for a study looking at the eThekwini metropole. 
While we may like to think that such a sample is a miniature representation of the 
population it aims to measure, it is possible that some groups may not be 
represented correctly. The problem of potential under or over representation of 
responses, or non-sampling bias, can be caused be several factors. Firstly, not all 
who are eligible to participate in a survey do take part in it, and not all the actual 
respondents necessarily answer all the surveys questions (Fink, 2003: 27). This is 
termed the problem of non-response. Secondly, how a sample is framed, in the 
definitions of the variables and how it includes or excludes responses will logically 
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influence the result (Fink, 2003: 26). Errors in the sample frame could also occur if 
the definitions of variables and what constitutes them change; an example could be if 
an occupational group listed in the ISCO groupings is collapsed into another, or if a 
new occupational group is added. It is important to organise a survey in a way that is 
consistent with the best available theory and also endure historical changes in social 
policy. Another way which surveys address problems of misrepresentation is through 
the concept of weighting. Surveys like the LFS use weighting adjustments which 
attaches an adjustment to each unit in the survey. These weights are constructed so 
that the sample, which is only a small part of the population, can be altered to an 
estimated value which would reflect the real values of the population. The weights in 
the LFS are expanded to represent the whole general South African population, so 
that the estimations of the survey are as accurate as possible. (Stats SA, 2013: 1).  It 
must be considered that estimates gathered by a single sample cannot be assumed 
to be exact measurements of a population. For the research to be effective, the 
sample and estimate must be as precise as possible.  
To help ensure this, Moser and Kalton (1971:69) argue that the standard distribution 
of an infinite number of samples can be used to assess the precision of an estimate 
derived from a single sample. The values of different sample estimates gather 
around the true value of the parameter in the population; the variation of the values 
of different sample estimates around the true population value is called the sampling 
error. It is important to understand the sampling error as it can show how much 
variation is to be expected among the estimates of other samples: the statistic which 
describes the sampling error is the standard error, which is the standard deviation of 
the distribution of sample estimates. By calculating the standard error, I will be able 
to determine how precise and reliable the estimates of a particular sample survey will 
be, by seeing how much the standard error of the estimate in the sample deviates 
from estimates of other, hypothetical samples. In this instance I will be measuring the 
standard error of the absolute numbers estimated by the surveys. As I will test 
hypotheses related to differences in employment size between occupational groups 
over time, it is crucial that the differences between estimates are accurate estimates 
of the real differences in the population, and not simply the result of random error. I 
will have to calculate the standard error to ensure that the differences in the sample 
estimates represent differences in the population. This calculation must be done at a 
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level where it is probable that numerous surveys would result in an estimate that falls 
within a particular interval, which is called the probability level (Czaja and Blair, 1996: 
127).  The specified interval, or confidence interval, will be the range of precision 
around the sample estimate. This range is formed by multiplying the calculated 
standard error multiplied by two, since I will use a 95% probability level to calculate 
the standard error that form the confidence intervals around my estimates. If the 
reliability of the sample estimate is at a probability level of 95%, then 95% of all other 
hypothetical sample surveys would result in an estimate that falls within my 
confidence intervals (Czaja and Blair, 1996: 127). If the standard error and the 
associated confidence interval of two estimates are too high then, for example, the 
differences between the two estimates for my occupational groups could be due to 
random error (Czaja and Blair, 1996: 126).  The estimate could be completely 
different in another sample, creating the possibility that the estimates with large 
differences could be reversed, calling into question the accuracy and reliability of the 
estimates, which I wish to avoid. On the other hand, if the standard error is 
appropriately small and at a 95% probability level, it will show that the estimates of 
the trends of the different occupational groups are not due to random error. 
Data Collection and Survey’s Used: 
This study relies on the statistics from the formal and informal sector regarding 
employment, unemployment, employment by economic sector, employment by 
occupational grouping and employment in population groups (race) collected by 
available population census and the later Labour Force Surveys (LFS’s). There are 
several sets of data: firstly, the population censuses which cover a series from 1980 
to 2001, specifically including data from 1980, 1991, 1996 and 2001. I did not use 
the 2011 population censuses as they do not include data on occupations. Instead I 
used data from the Labour Force Surveys post-2001. I firstly used a set of LFS’s 
from 2004 to 2007 which were collected bi-annually and formed part of the Post-
Apartheid Labour Market Surveys, which were accessed from Data First at the 
University of Cape Town. I then used a series of LFS’s from 2008 to 2014 which 
were accessed from Data First as well.  
In order to study the intended changes in eThekwini accurately, I have to address a 
geographical problem. The current eThekwini boundary is a metropolitan boundary 
that did not exist until recently (1994). Hence, Census data prior to 1994 do not have 
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a variable which measures the population within the post-1994 eThekwini boundary. 
To address this problem, I have collected the data of the Magisterial Districts that fall 
within the modern boundaries of eThekwini. Magisterial Districts are areas under the 
jurisdiction of a magistrate, which have been used by the state as the geographical 
units for the presentation of population census statistics. Due to their boundaries 
remaining relatively stable over many years, Magisterial Districts are the most 
historically accurate way of comparing the results of different population censuses 
(StatsSA, 2007). A table of all the Magisterial Districts I used is below. Some of the 
districts are used twice in the censuses prior to 1996, as the districts were divided 
racially, with frequency analysis only showing data for specific racial groups while 
excluding others. Hence I had to use both: in the 1980 and 1991 data, the Districts 
which are not labelled were taken from data that was designated only to include the 
white, coloured and Asian/ Indian populations. The 1980 and 1991 Districts which 
are repeated are labelled as “Black African Designated” was taken from datasets for 
the 1980 and 1991 Census designated for the black African population: 
 
1980 1991 1996 2001 
Durban Durban Durban Durban 
Pinetown  Camperdown Inanda Inanda 
Inanda Inanda Pinetown Pinetown 
Camperdown  Pinetown Chatsworth Chatsworth 
Empumalanga Chatsworth Camperdown Camperdown 
Embumbulu Embumbulu Umbumbulu Umbumbulu 
Camperdown (Black 
African Designated) Umlazi Umlazi Umlazi 
Umlazi Empumalanga 
  Ntuzuma Ntuzuma 
  Pintown (Black 
African Designated) 
   Table 1:  List of Magisterial Districts used to form eThekwini boundary, 1980-2001 censuses 
When classifying the different occupational groups, I made use of the International 
Standard Classification of Occupations(ISCO) major groupings or 1-digit occupation 
codes (International Labour Organisation, 2012:66-67) which namely are: Managers, 
Professionals, Technicians and Associate Professionals , Clerical Support Workers, 
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Services and Sales workers, Skilled Agricultural, Forestry and Fisheries workers, 
Craft and Related Trades workers, Plant and Machine Operators and Assemblers; 
and Elementary Occupations. Not all the population censuses used the ISCO major 
groupings classification. So in cases like the 1980 and 1991 data I had to classify the 
data from large lists of occupations into the ISCO groups. The ISCO 08 document 
(2012) has detailed descriptions of the groupings and which jobs fit in where, which 
was used to help re-code the data in the major groups. 
To determine the groupings for the different economic sectors and industries, I used 
a combination of the groups provided in the later LFS’s, and Statistics South Africa 
Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities (Stats SA, 2012). The 
standard industrial classification has a list of 21 groupings, which is more detailed 
and specified compared to the LFS which has a “main industry grouped” variable 
which only has 11 groupings. As there are less groups but a clear separation of 
manufacturing and service industries, it was still appropriate to use the LFS groups. 
The groups defined in the later LFS’s specifically are: “Agriculture”, “Mining”, 
“Manufacturing”, “Electricity, Gas and Water”, “Construction”, “Wholesale and Retail 
Trade”, “Transport”, “Financial Intermediation and business services”, “Personal and 
Community Services” and “Private Households”. As I am interested specifically in 
testing the argument that the manufacturing sector is declining the numbers and 
trends of employment in the manufacturing sector l be of particular interest. So too 
will the expected growth of the personal and community services and financial 
services sectors. 
Concerning the analysis of race, I used the “population group” variables in the data. 
The later 1996 and 2001 census, along with the LFS’s had the population group 
variable coded into “Black African”, “Coloured”, “Indian or Asian” and “White” racial 
groups, which we used for all our racial analysis. The earlier 1980 and 1991 data 
had more racial groups which often split off into different ethnic groupings, which I 
recoded into the 4 groups mentioned above. A table of the original racial groups for 
1980 to 1991 follows: 
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1970 1980 1980 Continued 
1991 
White White Xhosa 
White 
Malay Cape Coloured Zulu 
Indian or Asian 
Coloured Cape Malay Swazi 
Coloured 
Griqua Griqua South Ndebele 
Black 
Other Coloured Other Coloured North Ndebele 
 Indian or 
Pakistani Chinese North Sotho 
 Chinese Indian South Sotho 
 Other Asian Other Asian Tswana 
 South African 
Blacks 
 
Shangaan/Tsonga 
Foreign Blacks 
 
Venda 
 
  
Other Black 
 Finally, when looking at the employment and unemployment trends over time, it is 
important to note that I measured the employment variables only looking at the 
employed and unemployed workforce and not those who were “not economically 
active”. 
I used the SPSS program to view the data sets and to perform the various statistical 
analyses. To start off, I selected the appropriate magisterial districts or metropolitan 
cases that would measure employment in the eThekwini area, as discussed earlier in 
this chapter. For the occupational analysis, I used frequency distributions to measure 
the spread of the occupational distribution of employment in each specific year. I 
also used frequency distributions when looking at the changes in employment by 
economic sectors, and to measure the number of employed and unemployed. When 
looking at race, I used cross-tabulations to look at the racial population groups and 
the variable I wished to look at in racial terms. These specifically were the 
occupations and employment variables. To visually represent and display the results 
I used Microsoft Excel to create scatter plot graphs and tables which would show the 
trends over time, and give a better indication of how certain occupations grew or 
declined over the years, allowing us to test the hypothesis about deindustrialization 
and social polarization. I also used graphs to depict the changing racial composition 
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of each occupational group, and the employment and unemployment trends in racial 
terms.  
I must mention that the data from the 1991 census is highly problematic, as the 
estimates of the population are far too high. When looking at the occupations, the 
1991 data gave estimates for clerical support workers and services and sales 
workers and crafts and related trades workers which are higher than values recorded 
by labour force surveys 15 years later. This large spike in employment then 
immediately comes down again in the 1996 census and only reaches such heights 
again post 2005. I suspect that the estimates and the weights used were not done 
well, and using this data should be done with caution. This study also recommends 
that the 1991 census should be looked at again and reweighted to fix these 
problems. 
Main Occupational Groups: 
To test the social polarization hypothesis I have attempted to categorise the 
International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) occupational groups into 
smaller groups that correspond to the ISCO skill ranking average monthly salary of 
each group. The reasoning for this is that the social polarization hypothesis should 
be conceptualised as the growth in occupations that are higher-paid and higher-
skilled or lower-paid and less-skilled than the manufacturing jobs that are argued to 
be in decline, which are semi-skilled, middle income occupations. I have hence 
classified “legislators, senior officials and managers”, “professionals” and 
“technicians and associate professionals” into one category for “highly-skilled, high-
income workers”. Unlike studies like those by Baum (1997) and Chiu and Lui (2004), 
who classify “services and sales workers” as unskilled, low-income occupations, I 
have classified them, along with “clerical support workers” as “semi-skilled, middle-
income workers” (also referred to as “white-collar, middle-income jobs) as done by 
Crankshaw and Borel-Saladin (2009; 2014). This is based on evidence that these 
jobs share the same ISCO skill ranking and that the average monthly salary of this 
group is significantly higher than low-skilled, low-income elementary jobs and also 
slightly higher than “craft and related trades workers and plant and machine 
operators and assemblers” (also referred to as “blue-collar, middle-income jobs)  The 
occupational group of “skilled agricultural, forestry and fisheries workers” is quite a 
problematic one as it could be possible to classify them as either low-income or 
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semi-skilled workers. These workers have the lowest average income of all the 
groups and yet they are not unskilled elementary workers. It could be possible to 
classify them as low-income workers but these jobs are more skilled than the 
unskilled manual work performed by most elementary workers. However, skilled 
agricultural, forestry and fisheries workers were by far the lowest number of 
employed workers in the workforce with very low counts, due to eThekwini being an 
urban area; as a result, I have not included this occupational group in the income 
analysis. 
International 
Standard Occupation 
Average 
Monthly 
Salary (R) 
Occupation Grouped by 
Income 
Average 
Monthly 
Salary (R) 
99% 
Standard 
Error 
Managers 8,906 Highly-Skilled, High-
Income 
Managers, Professionals 
and Technicians 
 
7,813 379 
Professionals 7,609 
Technicians and 
Associate 
Professionals 
7,121 
Clerical Support 
Workers 
5,243 
White-Collar, Semi-
Skilled, Middle-Income  
Clerical, Services and 
Sales Workers 
 
4,931 
 
359 
 Services and Sales 
Workers 
4,645 
Craft and Related 
Trades Workers 
3,951 
Blue-Collar, Semi-
Skilled, Middle-Income  
Craft and Trades 
Workers and Plant and 
Machine Operators and 
Assemblers  
4,129 
 
205 
 
Plant and Machine 
Operators and 
Assemblers 
4,298 
Elementary Workers 2,671 
Low-skilled, Low-income 
Elementary (Unskilled) 
Workers 
2,671 181 
Table 3: Occupational Groups and their Average Monthly income in eThekwini 2013 
(Source: 2013 Labour Market Dynamics Survey) 
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Standard Error Calculations: 
I performed standard error calculations on several of the results of my analysis, 
which are discussed in chapters 3 and 4. These are namely the growth of economic 
sectors, occupational groups, employment and unemployment and the racial 
composition of the occupational groups and of the employed and unemployed. I 
particularly focused on the standard error of the overall trends, to show that the 
results of employment growth in the variables like occupational groups, when 
compared to each other, were not due to random error. I used the formula 
recommended by Moser and Kalton (1971) for calculating one standard error of a 
proportion: The formula is below in which “p” is the proportion of the sample estimate 
and “n” is the sample size of the population, in this case the employed workforce. 
1 s.e.(p) = 1 * √p(1-p)/n 
In this case the single (“1”) standard deviation score will be substituted with 1.96, as 
that is the number of standard deviations that measures 95% of the area under the 
normal curve. As it would be impractical to showcase every standard error 
calculation here or when discussing the results in chapter 3 and 4, I have presented 
an example of how one of my standard error calculations was done below, 
specifically the calculation for the workers employed in the manufacturing sector 
from the 2014 LFS. I ran unweighted frequency distributions for the total employed 
workforce to generate the initial sample size (n) and I calculated the proportion (p) by 
dividing the estimated number of workers in the manufacturing sector by the total 
number of employed workers across all the economic sectors. 
2014 Q1 95% Standard Error of the Proportion (s.e.p) 
- 95% (s.e.p) = 1.96  √ 0.2 (1- 0.2)/ 203 
                 = 1.96 x √ 0.2 (0.8)/ 1431  
                 = 1.96 x √ 0.145494511/ 1431  
                 = 0. 01976 
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With this value we could then determine the standard error of the absolute estimate 
total by multiplying the standard error of the proportion by the absolute estimate, as 
argued by Lohr (2009,37). Hence, the 95% standard error of the absolute estimate 
(s.e.a) will be:  
              95% s.e.a  = 0. 01976 x 208,056 
              = 4,112  
Therefore, the confidence interval ranges from 4,112 less than 208,056 (203,944) to 
4,112 greater than 208,056 (212,168), with the total confidence interval being 
2x 4,112 = 8,224. 
Standard Error calculations and the associated confidence intervals of estimates 
from the data will be of particular importance, specifically: 
1)  When assessing the differences in trends related to changes of numbers of 
employed in the different economic sectors, the long-term changes in the 
different occupational groups in the occupational structure and changes in the 
unemployment rate. 
2) The racial compositions of the occupational structure and of the unemployed. 
3) This will of course be dependent on the results, which I will begin to address 
in chapter 3 which deals with changes of employment in eThekwini’s 
economic sectors and occupational structure. 
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Chapter 3: 
Changes in eThekwini’s Occupational Structure of Employment 
In this chapter I will discuss the results of my analysis of eThekwini’s changing 
occupational structure. The particular focus here will be threefold: firstly on whether 
employment in the manufacturing industry has declined, thus testing the 
deindustrialization hypothesis. Secondly, I will measure the changes in eThekwini’s 
occupational structure since 1980 to test the occupational polarization and 
professionalization arguments and how the results from eThekwini area fit into the 
occupation structure debate. Lastly, this chapter will look at unemployment rate of 
eThekwini’s workforce and how this relates to changes taking place in the 
occupational structure. I argue that eThekwini has undergone deindustrialization, but 
that the pattern of employment growth is not a polarizing or professionalizing one. 
My results show that there has been large growth in both low-skilled, low-income and 
highly-skilled, high-income occupations, but that the largest absolute growth of 
employment has been in the combination of white-collar and blue-collar semi-skilled 
occupations. This has resulted in a pattern of middle-income growth. I will also argue 
that while the unemployment rate in eThekwini is lower than the national rate, there 
is a large class of unemployed workers which forms a division in the occupational 
structure between the employed and unemployed, which is also contrary to the 
social polarisation hypothesis. All the statistical changes discussed and relevant to 
arguments were calculated at a 95% probability level. In some cases like the 
discussions on absolute changes in economic sectors and occupational groups, I 
have specifically mentioned the 95% confidence intervals. 
Deindustrialization in eThekwini: 
To look at how employment has changed across the various economic sectors in 
eThekwini over the last few decades I performed cross-tabulations of employment in 
each of the major economic sectors to record the changes over time. This is 
represented visually in figure 1.   
An immediate observation about employment trends in eThekwini’s economic 
sectors is that the manufacturing sector has not declined in the same rapid and 
substantial deindustrialization experienced by Johannesburg’s manufacturing sector 
(Crankshaw and Borel-Saladin, 2014: 1855). In terms of absolute employment, the 
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manufacturing sector experienced considerable employment growth from 1980 until 
the mid-2000s. The last decade has seen the manufacturing sector experience 
slower growth, as there has been a decline in its rate of increase, which is further 
evidenced when considering relative employment. The evidence shows that in 2001 
the manufacturing sector account for 24 percent of employment across all the 
economic sectors; by 2014 this share had decreased to 18 percent (table 4). The 
considerable relative decline of employment in manufacturing from 2001 to 2014 is 
evidence of deindustrialization. The relative decline in manufacturing employment is 
quite a contrast to sectors that have experienced growth, such as the financial 
services sector and wholesale and retail trade sectors in which employment has 
grown in both relative and absolute terms during the same 2001 to 2014 period. 
If this result from eThekwini is compared to the deindustrialization experienced by 
Johannesburg, a similarity is that both cities’ manufacturing sectors are employing 
less than 20 percent of their respective workforces. The difference in size is quite 
small, with only 2 percent difference between the 18 percent in eThekwini in 2014, 
and the 16 percent in Johannesburg in 2010 (Crankshaw and Borel-Saladin, 2014: 
1855). The difference between these two cities is that the relative size of 
employment in Johannesburg’s manufacturing sector declined dramatically in the 
1980’s and then recovered (Crankshaw and Borel-Saladin, 2014: 1855). In 
eThekwini, employment in manufacturing started to decline only in the mid-2000s, 
which could possibly be related to Durban’s role as a port city and the historical 
importance of manufacturing in such an environment. What both Johannesburg and 
eThekwini do share is a faster employment growth in the service sector, which has 
overtaken the growth in manufacturing. The resultant deindustrialization experienced 
due to the relative decrease of employment in the manufacturing sector is argued to 
result in social polarization, according to scholars like Sassen (1991, 9). 
Sectors related to services, namely the community, social and personal services 
sector (hereafter, ‘personal services’) and the finances, real estate and insurance 
services sector (hereafter, ‘financial services’), experienced considerable growth in 
employment from 1980 to 2014. Absolute employment in the personal services 
sector grow steadily from 1980 until 20141.There has been a slight decline in 
                                                          
1 I suspect the large values for this sector in 1996 are a result of weighting problems as the numbers 
are unrealistic in comparison to the years before and immediately after. 
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personal services in terms of relative employment, however: in 2001 personal 
services accounted for 23 percent of all employment in eThekwini and, by 2014, this 
had declined to 20 percent (table 4). Despite this relative decline, personal services 
are taking up a portion of the employed workforce currently larger in size than the 
manufacturing sector. 
 
Figure 1: Employment by Economic Sector in eThekwini 1980-2014.  
Employment in the financial, real estate, insurance and other business services 
sector grew at a slower rate than employment in community, social and personal 
services. However, the financial services sector has experienced continuous growth 
of employment from 1980 to 2014. In relative terms, financial services only 
accounted for 3 percent of employment in eThekwini in 1980 but by 2001 this had 
increased to 13 percent. By 2014 this relative share had grown to 16%, a large 
difference from 1980 (table 4). This notable relative growth was also accompanied 
by large growth in absolute terms: there was more absolute growth of employment 
between 1980 and 2014 in financial services than in any other economic sector 
(evidenced by percentage growth in table 5). Additionally, absolute growth in 
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financial services from 2001 to 2014 was larger than the growth in either personal 
services or manufacturing, only being smaller than the absolute growth experienced 
by wholesale and retail trade during the same period (table 5).Alongside the large 
growth of absolute employment, the wholesale and retail trade sector also has the 
largest share of relative employment, accounting for 26 percent of employment in 
eThekwini’s economic sectors in 2014, a notable increase from the 21 percent it 
accounted for in 2001(table 4). 
Economic Sectors 1980 2001 2014 
Wholesale and Retail 
Trade 
17 21 26 
Community: social and 
personal services 
25 23 20 
Manufacturing 24 24 18 
Financial Services 3 13 16 
Transport 6 8 9 
Agriculture, hunting, 
forestry and fishing 
18 3 1 
Mining and Quarrying 0 0 0 
Electricity: Gas and 
Water supply 
1 1 0 
Construction 7 6 11 
Total 100 100 100 
Table 4: Relative changes of employment in economic sectors, 1980, 2001 and 2014 
(% point change) (Source: South African Population Censuses 1980, 2001 and 
Labour Force Survey 2014) 
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Economic 
Sectors 
1980 2001 2014 
Absolute 
Change 
1980-
2014 
Absolute 
Change 
2001-
2014 
% 
Change 
1980-
2014 
% 
Change 
2001-
2014 
Wholesale and 
Retail Trade 
39,913 134,543 304,759 264,846 170,216 664 127 
Community: 
social and 
personal 
services 
60,480 148,645 233,328 172,848 84,683 286 57 
Manufacturing 56,470 156,619 208,056 151,586 51,437 268 33 
Financial 
Services 
6,308 84,634 189,784 183,476 105,150 2909 124 
Transport 14,328 50,967 106,366 92,038 55,399 642 109 
Table 5: Absolute changes of employment in economic sectors, 1980, 2001 and 2014 
(Source: South African Population Censuses 1980, 2001 and Labour Force Survey 
2014) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Confidence Intervals calculated at the 95% probability level for employment 
changes in economic sectors, 1980-2014 and 2001-2014. 
 
Is eThekwini experiencing social polarization or professionalization? 
As mentioned in chapter 2, I analysed the changes in employment of eThekwini’s 
occupations by using both the single-digit ISCO groups (Major Groups) and then with 
a second set of occupational groups categorized out of the initial ISCO groupings 
and their associated monthly salaries. The rationale for this is that as I am attempting 
Economic Sectors 
95% Confidence 
Interval 1980-2014 
95% Confidence 
Interval 2001-2014 
Wholesale and Retail 
Trade 
257,930 - 271,762 163,300 - 170,216 
Community: social 
and personal services 
168,029 - 177, 667 79,864 - 89,502 
Manufacturing 147,474 - 155,698 47,325 - 55,548 
Financial Services 179,860 - 187,092 101,534 - 108,766 
Transport 90,458 - 93,618 53,819 - 56,979 
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to test the social polarization hypothesis, which should be conceptualised as growth 
in employment of jobs that are either higher-income, higher-skilled or less-paid and 
lesser-skilled, and the decline of employment in middle-income, semi-skilled jobs.  
Before evaluating the evidence, it will be useful to conceptualise what a polarizing or 
professionalizing pattern would be in relation to various occupational groups. If 
eThekwini is experiencing a polarization of its occupational structure the expected 
pattern of growth would be large growth in highly-skilled, high-income and low-
skilled, low-income occupations and an accompanied decline in semi-skilled, middle-
income occupations. Logically such a polarizing pattern of growth would involve 
growth in the managers, professionals, technicians and associate professional 
grouping of occupations and in elementary occupations. While scholars in favour of 
polarization have argued that a polarizing pattern would also involve the growth of 
semi-skilled clerical support, services and sales occupations as they are low-income 
jobs, I have presented evidence in chapter 2 to the contrary. The average monthly 
salary of clerical support workers and services and sales workers (or white-collar 
jobs) was calculated as higher than the monthly salaries of craft and related trades 
workers and plant and machine operators and assemblers (or blue-collar jobs). 
Proponents of the polarization thesis conceptualise these blue-collar jobs as the 
declining middle-income jobs giving the polarized occupational structure its 
hourglass-like shape. Therefore, a pattern of growth that includes growth of semi-
skilled clerical support, services and sales jobs cannot be conceptualized as 
polarization as they are not low-income occupations. If eThekwini’s occupational 
structure is undergoing a professionalized pattern of growth, there will be evidence of 
absolute growth of employment in highly-skilled, high-income managerial, 
professional, technical and associate professional occupations, alongside a decline 
or stagnation in all other occupational groups. If there is an equal pattern of growth in 
all occupations, then it will be evidence of an occupational structure that is not 
experiencing professionalization. 
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Figure 2: Employment by Major Occupational Group in eThekwini 1970-2014 
As shown in figure 2, absolute employment in managerial, professional, technical 
and associate professional jobs grew enormously. In 1980, highly-skilled, highly-paid 
jobs had the lowest number of employed workers in eThekwini, but by 2014 it had 
become one of the largest occupational groups, increasing almost fifteen-fold from 
1980 to 2014. These highly-skilled, high-income jobs also grew significantly in 
regards to relative employment. In 1980 they accounted for only 9 percent of all 
employment in eThekwini’s occupational structure; by 2014 this had increased to 26 
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percent, a staggering percentage point change of 17 percent (table 7). Striking as 
well is the growth of clerical support, services and sales workers, which I also refer to 
as “white-collar” semi-skilled jobs. While white-collar jobs declined in relative terms 
from 1980 to 2014, declining by 5 percentage points from 32 to 28 percent, absolute 
employment in clerical support, services and sales jobs grew considerably (table 8, 
9). Though the percentage change in absolute employment from 1980 to 2014 was 
not as drastic as that experienced by managers, professionals, technicians and 
associate professionals or elementary workers (partly due to being the largest 
occupational group in 1980) clerical support, services and sales workers was the 
largest occupational group in 2014.  
Table 7: Relative changes in the occupational distribution of the employed workforce, 1980 
and 2014 (Source: South African Population Census 1980 and Labour Force Survey 
2014) 
Jobs found in the craft and related trades workers and plant and machine operators 
and assemblers group, also referred to as “blue-collar” (manual) semi-skilled jobs 
grew at a slower rate than those found in clerical support, services and sales 
occupations. Absolute employment in blue-collar middle-income employment did 
increase substantially from 1980 to 2014, but the percentage growth during this 
period (table 9), at 280 percent, was lower than the percentage change for highly 
skilled, high-income jobs (1482 percent), white-collar middle-income jobs (355 
percent) and low-skilled, low-income jobs ( 1094 percent). 
 
Occupations 1980 2014 Change 
Highly-Skilled, High-Income Occupations 9 26 17 
White-Collar Middle-Income Occupations 32 28 -5 
Blue-Collar Middle-Income Occupations 29 21 -8 
Low-Skilled, Low-Income Occupations 11 25 14 
Skilled agricultural, forestry and fisheries 
workers 
18 0 -18 
All Occupations 100 100 
 
All Semi-Skilled, Middle-Income 
Occupations 
62 49 -13 
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Table 8: Employment by major occupational groups in eThekwini, 1980-2014 
There is also evidence of a relative decline in these blue-collar jobs when looking at 
relative employment: in 1980 they made up 29 percent of employment in eThekwini, 
but by 2014 this had declined to 21 percent (table 7). This is notable for two several 
reasons: firstly, no other occupational group apart from craft and related trades 
workers and plant and machine operators and assemblers declined in relative terms 
from 1980 to 2014. Secondly, while blue-collar workers had the second largest 
number of employed workers in 1980, in 2014 they had the lowest employment of all 
the main occupational groups excluding skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery 
workers (table 8). Perhaps most interestingly is the trend for low-skilled, low-income 
elementary workers: a small group in 1980, it grew massively in both absolute and 
relative terms between 1980 and 2014. 
Elementary jobs had the second largest percentage change in terms of absolute 
growth, and their share of eThekwini’s relative employment increased from 11 
percentage points in 1980 to 25 percentage points in 2014 (table 7). This long-term 
trend of employment in low-skilled, low-income occupations is intriguing as it is quite 
similar to the trend of highly-skilled, high-income occupations discussed above. 
Absolute 
Employment 
1980 1991 1996 2001 2005 2010 2014 
Managers, 
professionals, 
technicians and 
associate 
professionals. 
21,140 141,547 166,382 197,887 244,415 269,035 334,457 
Clerical Support 
workers and 
service and sales 
workers 
78,428 288,869 136,133 192,867 263,501 279,869 356,889 
Craft and related 
trades workers and 
plant and machine 
operators and 
assemblers 
70,390 279,961 169,747 173,506 278,074 257,654 267,400 
Elementary 
workers 
27,230 183,168 160,977 163,210 251,554 238,988 325,225 
Skilled agricultural, 
forestry and 
fisheries workers 
44,416 21,908 9,152 6,037 4,868 5,391 - 
Total 241,604 937,982 642,391 792,098 1,046,642 1,050,937 1,283,971 
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Employment in both occupational groups increased massively in both absolute and 
relative terms, with the growth of low-skilled, low-income jobs being smaller but 
following a similar trend. 
After establishing the long-term trends in each occupational group, I can consider 
how the employment growth of the occupational structure as a whole relates to the 
debate about polarization and professionalization. Between 1980 and 2014, the 
largest absolute growth of employment was in highly-skilled, high-income 
managerial, professional, technical and associate professional jobs (table 9, 
figure 3). There was also very large growth of employment low-skilled, low-income 
elementary occupations. As for the employment trajectory of semi-skilled jobs, there 
are two noticeable trends. While employment in blue-collar craft and related trades 
workers and plant and machine operators and assemblers decline relative to the 
growth experienced by other occupational groups, it grew in absolute terms. Despite 
the relative decline of blue-collar jobs, the large absolute growth of semi-skilled, 
white-collar jobs associated with service sector occupations like clerical support, 
services and sales workers is particularly striking. This absolute growth is 
comparable to the growth experienced by highly-skilled, high-income and low-skilled, 
low-income occupations (table 9). If the growth of semi-skilled, white-collar and blue-
collar jobs is considered together, the combined absolute growth was so large that it 
is greater than the absolute growth experienced by both highly-skilled and low-skilled 
occupations (table 9; figure 4). As semi-skilled, middle-income occupations 
experienced the largest absolute growth of employment in eThekwini, this result 
does not support the social polarisation hypothesis. A polarising pattern of 
employment is one defined by absolute decline of employment in semi-skilled 
occupations, alongside absolute growth of employment in low-skilled and highly-
skilled jobs; my evidence is contrary to this. 
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Table 9: Absolute changes in the occupational distribution of the employed workforce, 1980 
and 2014 (Source: South African Population Census 1980 and Labour Force Survey 
2014) 
The argument for an occupational structure dominated by semi-skilled, middle-
income employment is strengthened further if I look at the relative employment 
changes. When combining white-collar and blue-collar semi-skilled employment into 
a single semi-skilled, middle-income category, such a grouping would account for 62 
percent (table 7) of all employment in all occupations in 1980. In 2014, the combined 
semi-skilled, middle-income grouping would still account for 49 percent of all 
employment which, while smaller, is evidence of an occupational structure 
dominated by semi-skilled jobs and large, continuous growth of middle-income 
employment (table 7).  
This is an unexpected result as it is not indicative of either occupational polarization 
or professionalization. Firstly, while the growth in both low-skilled, low-income and 
highly-skilled, high-income occupations is large, the status of all semi-skilled, middle-
income jobs as the occupational group with the largest absolute growth since 1980 is 
evidence that eThekwini’s occupational structure is not taking on an hourglass form, 
split between highly-skilled, high-income and low-skilled, low-income jobs. Thus I 
argue that the overall pattern of employment growth is not a polarizing one, largely 
due to the continued growth of white-collar, clerical support and sales jobs. The 
Occupations 
Absolute 
Employment 
1980 
Absolute 
Employment 
2014 
Absolute 
Change 
% 
Change 
Change 
95% 
Confidence 
Intervals 
Highly-Skilled, High-
Income Occupations 21 140 334 457 313 317 1482 
306,033 - 
320,601 
White-Collar Middle-
Income Occupations 78 428 356 889 278 461 355 
270,527 -
286,395 
Blue-Collar Middle-
Income Occupations 70 390 267 400 197 010 280 
191,622 - 
202,398 
Low-Skilled, Low-
Income Occupations 27 230 325 225 297 995 1094 
290,976 -
305,014 
All Occupations 197 188 1 283 971    
All Semi-Skilled, 
Middle-Income 
Occupations 
148 818 624 289 475 471 319 459,987 - 490,955 
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results also do not support the professionalization argument, which predicts that the 
professional and managerial middle-class has grown dramatically more than all other 
occupations (Hamnett, 1994). What does seem to be present is the general 
upgrading of skills of the employed workforce: due to the growth of semi-skilled 
(particularly white-collar service jobs) and high-skilled, high-income managerial and 
professional jobs, there has been a greater growth in jobs that required semi-skilled 
or greater expertise relative to the growth of low-skilled jobs. The number of jobs that 
require skilled, non-manual workers (highly-skilled professionals, managers and 
technicians or semiskilled clerical support and sales workers) have experienced 
significant more absolute growth than those which are unskilled or low-skilled (figure 
3, table 9). While this result does not support the professionalization trend defined by 
the domination of only the highly-skilled managerial, professional, technical and 
associate professional jobs experienced by Johannesburg’s occupational structure 
(Crankshaw and Borel-Saladin, 2014: 1860), eThekwini is experiencing a pattern of 
employment which is dominated by the increasing of skills. There is large growth in 
both highly-skilled and semi-skilled occupations, thus the increasing of skills is not 
merely in highly-skilled “professional” type jobs which the professionalization 
argument is termed after (figure 3). However, as I demonstrated in discussing the 
changing patterns of relative employment, and in figure 4 below, combining all semi-
skilled occupations into one occupational grouping indicates that middle-income 
occupations have experienced the most absolute growth, and in terms of relative 
employment they account for the largest share of employment in eThekwini’s 
occupational structure by a considerable margin. Thus I argue that the eThekwini 
workforce is experiencing a pattern that is neither polarizing nor professionalizing, 
but one of semi-skilled middle-income growth (figure 4). 
Theories that argue for specific changes in the occupational structure have been 
described by using analogies with shapes to portray the pattern of growth associated 
with the argument. For example, Marcuse (1989: 699) describes the pattern argued 
for by the polarization argument is taking the shape of an hourglass, divided by 
growth at the top (high-income jobs) and at the bottom (low-income jobs) while the 
centre is narrow due to the argued decline in middle-income jobs. The typical Fordist 
occupational structure shape was argued to be that of an egg, which due to middle-
income manufacturing growth, was widest in the middle-area, occupied by middle-
42 
 
income jobs (Marcuse, 1989: 699). While manufacturing has declined in eThekwini, 
due to the pattern of middle-income growth spurred on by the growth of white-collar 
jobs, I argue that eThekwini’s pattern of growth can also be described as a similar 
shape. Due to the accompanied growth in high-income and low-income jobs, 
perhaps an onion shape (which is more rounded at the top and bottom than an egg) 
is more appropriate. 
 
Figure 3: Changes in employment across the occupational structure, grouped by income; separation 
of middle-income white-collar and blue-collar occupations.2 
 
                                                          
2 The confidence intervals for the employment estimates of the occupational groups and the absolute changes 
in figure 3 and 4 were calculated at a 95% probability level, and are shown in table 9. 
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Figure 4: Changes in employment across the occupational structure, grouped by income; all semi-
skilled occupations combined.  
The impact of unemployment: 
Alongside the increasing demand for skills in the workforce is increasing 
unemployment. The national unemployment rate in South Africa has increased from 
the 16 percent recorded in the mid-1970’s (Bell,1985: 25) to 25 percent in 2012 
(Stats SA, 2012: 25). In eThekwini unemployment increased steadily from 15 percent 
in 1980 to very high numbers in most of the 2000’s such as the 28 percent in 2005. 
Since then, it has declined, with the most recent 2014 estimate at 16 percent (table 
10). There is a notable difference between the unemployment rate in eThekwini (16 
percent) and the national rate (25 percent). This could be accounted for by taking 
into account that my results have shown large growth of employment in low-skilled, 
low-income jobs. With a large demand for low-skilled jobs, there will be opportunities 
for unskilled and low-skilled labourers in eThekwini’s labour market. This could at 
least partly explain why there is a lower rate of unemployment in the city. While the 
 -
 100,000
 200,000
 300,000
 400,000
 500,000
 600,000
 700,000
1980 2014 Absolute Change
Em
p
lo
ym
e
n
t Highly-Skilled,
High-Income
Occupations
All Semi-Skilled,
Middle-Income
Occupations
Low-Skilled,
Low-Income
Occupations
44 
 
unemployment rate has declined in recent years, and is lower than the national rate, 
it remains high. The large number of unemployed is significant for this study for 
several reasons: firstly as it a feature of the professionalization argument. As the 
demand for skills in workers is increasing, those who are unskilled are left with fewer 
opportunities to find work. This results in a social class division where on one hand 
there is a growing class of increasingly well-paid, highly-skilled non-manual workers 
and on the other there is growing group of unemployed workers, who as termed by 
Esping-Anderson (1993) and Hamnett (1996), can be referred to as an “outsider 
surplus population”. While I have presented evidence that there is still a demand for 
low-skilled, low-income jobs with the high number of employed elementary workers, 
this has not stopped the unemployment rate from reaching the highs it has. 
Secondly, the existence of a large class of unemployed workers is at odds with the 
social polarization hypothesis, which argues that the primary division in the 
occupational structure is between high and low-income workers. If 16 percent of the 
workforce is unemployed, there is a significant division between the employed (on all 
levels) and the unemployed. 
Employment Status 1980 2005 2010 2014 
Employed 249,603 1,046,642 1,050,938 1,283,970 
Unemployed 43,915 416,165 151,167 249,217 
Unemployment Rate 15 28 13 16 
Table 10: Unemployment in eThekwini, 1980, 2005, 2010 and 20143 
This high unemployment rate has particular consequences for racial inequality, both 
between racial groups, in what can be referred to as inter-racial inequality, and within 
such racial groups in what can be called intra-racial inequality. As scholars have 
argued elsewhere, South Africa’s Apartheid past has left a legacy where a large 
portion of the local black African population faces living in poor socio-economic 
environments that puts them at prime risk for unemployment and becoming the 
“outsider surplus populace”. In the next chapter, I will look at how these changes in 
occupations and growing unemployment has affected the racial population groups in 
the eThekwini area. The relationship between race and class will also be of particular 
importance 
                                                          
3 The 95% confidence interval for the 2014 unemployment estimate is 244,886 – 253,548. The interval for the 
2014 employed estimate is 1,262,383 – 1,305,557. 
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Chapter 4: 
A Question of Racial Inequality 
The focus of this chapter is to investigate how eThekwini’s changing occupational 
structure has affected racial inequality within the city, and how the representation of 
racial groups within specific occupational groups reflects racial class divisions 
between different income levels. Of particular concern also will be the relationship 
between unemployment and race, and if unemployment is particularly dominated by 
racial groups which were disadvantaged during Apartheid who now form part of an 
“outsider surplus population”. I will argue that the middle-class is becoming de-
racialized, with substantial growth in employment of black Africans and Indians in 
highly-skilled, high-income and semi-skilled, middle-income jobs. This result is 
contrary to the argument that social polarisation results in socioeconomic 
polarisation based on race. Despite the de-racialisation of the middle-class, I will also 
present evidence that black Africans almost entirely account for employment in low-
skilled, low-income jobs and that they also dominate the class of unemployed. I 
argue that this is evidence of inter-racial inequality when contrasted with the over-
representation of the employed white population in highly-skilled, high-income jobs. I 
also present evidence of growing intra-racial inequality between black Africans who 
are employed in low-income jobs or unemployed, and the growing number of black 
Africans employed in high-income jobs. Once again, the statistical changes 
discussed and relevant to my arguments were calculated at a 95% probability level.  
Is the occupational structure becoming de-racialized? 
A hallmark of racially inequality within the city will be how the occupational structure 
is distributed racially; scholars like Wolpe (1977:153),Simkins and Hindson (1979: 1-
12)  and Crankshaw (1997a; 1997b: 635) argued that the 1970’s saw an increase of 
coloureds, Asians and black Africans into non-manual, more-skilled employment. 
Wolpe in particular emphasised a noticeable growth in the black African middle class 
between the 1960’s and 1970’s. Logically, opportunities for better education and the 
required qualifications for more-skilled better-paying jobs will only have increased for 
coloureds, Asians/Indians and black Africans after the end of Apartheid. Access to 
highly-skilled, highly-paid managerial, professional and technical jobs in particular 
should have improved, leading to the de-racialization of jobs within the high-income 
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brackets. It could also be expected that black Africans and Indians could gain better 
access to semi-skilled jobs and employment in general, backed up by government 
policies like affirmative action are aimed at giving those who were previously 
disadvantaged a foothold in South Africa’s economic sphere. To test this, I ran cross-
tabulations of the occupations and racial population group variables, looking at how 
employment within each occupational group was distributed according to race. I 
used the same main occupational groups that grouped the single-digit ISCO groups 
together according to income that were conceptually detailed in chapter 2 and used 
for the occupational analysis in chapter 3. 
The racial composition of highly-skilled, highly-paid managerial, professional, 
associate professional and technical jobs (figure 5) stayed quite similar for several 
decades before changing somewhat dramatically over the past 10 years. While black 
Africans, Indians and whites all experienced employment growth within this 
occupational grouping from 1980, managerial, professional and technical jobs were 
largely dominated by the white population. The white population continuously 
accounted for the largest absolute number of managers, professionals and 
technicians until the late 2000’s and went through periods where they alone made up 
for almost 40% of this entire occupational group, as in 2005 (table 11). This started 
to change by the late 2000’s, with both black Africans and Indians starting to 
outnumber whites in these highly-skilled, highly-paid jobs. By 2014, black Africans 
account for 46 percent of these jobs, a domination which is the complete inverse of 
previous decades (table 11). The Indian population too has had a larger 
representation within this occupational grouping than whites the last several years. 
Race 1980 1996 2001 2005 2010 2014 
Black African 52 28 31 29 35 46 
Coloured 1 3 4 7 1 3 
Indian or Asian 19 31 32 26 38 29 
White 28 39 33 38 27 22 
All Races 100 100 100 100 101 100 
Table 11: Relative employment of managers, professionals, technicians and associate 
professionals by race, 1980-2014 
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Figure 5: Employment in managerial, professional or associate professional or technical 
occupations by race, 1980 to 2014. 
Race 1980 1996 2001 2005 2010 2014 
Black African 10,985 45,575 60,890 70,956 93,141 152,611 
Coloured 244 5,016 7,937 15,733 3,274 10,843 
Indian or Asian 4,091 50,846 63,428 62,293 100,913 96,166 
White 5,820 63,662 65,628 92,793 71,710 74,836 
All Races 21,140 166,383 197,883 241,775 269,038 334,456 
Table 12: Employment of managers, professionals, associate professionals and technicians 
by race, 1980-2014 
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Table 13: Employment change in highly-skilled, high-income occupations by racial groups: 
2005 and 2014. 
It should be noted that the total employed white population has declined. Despite the 
decline in the absolute number of employed whites, the majority of their employed 
can be found in these managerial, professional or technical occupations: In 2014, 78 
percent of all employed whites were employed in these high-income jobs (table 14). 
In fact, relative to the size of all employed whites, the percentage of whites employed 
in highly-skilled, high-income occupations has actually increased between 2005 to 
2014 (table 14).  
White 
Employment by 
Occupation 
Absolute 
Employed 
2005 
Relative 
Employed 
2005 
Absolute 
Employed 
2014 
Relative 
Employed 
2014 
Absolute 
Change 
2005-
2014 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
2005-2014 
Highly-Skilled, 
High-Income 
Jobs 
92,793 60 74,836 78 -17,957 
32,219 - 
3,695 
White-Collar, 
Middle-Income 
Jobs 
37,419 24 14,121 15 -23,298 
26,508 - 
20,088 
Blue-Collar, 
Middle-Income 
Jobs 
23,269 15 4,796 5 -18,473 
20,265 - 
16,681 
Low-Skilled, 
Low-Income 
Jobs 
867 1 1,814 2 947 890 - 1,004 
Total Employed 
Whites 
153,481 100 95,567 100 -57,914 
62,962 - 
52,866 
Table 14: Absolute and relative changes of employment of whites in the occupational 
structure, 2005 and 2014 (Source: Labour Force Surveys: 2005 and 2014) 
 
2005 2014 
Race 
Employment 
in High-
Income Jobs 
% of all 
employme
nt in high-
income 
jobs 
Total 
Employed 
Employment 
in High-
Income Jobs 
% of 
employed 
in high-
income 
jobs 
Total 
Employment 
Black African 70,956 29 637,493 152,611 46 939,703 
Indian or 
Asian 
62,293 26 198,932 96,166 29 219,449 
White 92,793 38 156,667 74,836 22 95,567 
Coloured 15,733 7 50,910 10,843 3 29,251 
All Races 241,775 100 
1,044,00
2 
334,456 100 1,283,970 
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This high representation of whites in managerial, professional, technical and 
associate professional jobs is striking, as they amount to a small share of 
eThekwini’s employed workforce in comparison to black Africans (figure 14 shows 
that as of 2014 there were 95,567 employed whites compared to the 794,280 
employed black Africans in table 26). Despite this, whites have a very high 
representation in the most-skilled and best-paid jobs. Only recently have other racial 
groups with larger total employed populations come to also have large numbers in 
the most lucrative occupations (figure 5). While it can be argued that the white 
population had the education and skills needed to be employed in these jobs since 
the Apartheid era, it took over a decade for this occupational grouping to deracialise, 
and if there is such a high percentage of the total number of employed whites in 
these jobs, one would expect them not to have high representation in the worse-paid 
occupations. This is proven to be true when we look at all the other occupations: 
despite periods where whites had numbers ranging from 14-20 percent of 
employment in white-collar clerical support and services and sales jobs, whites have 
not had large representations in any of the other occupational groups (table 14). By 
2014, whites amounted to only 1 percent of employment in elementary occupations 
and 2 percent of employment in craft and related trades workers and plant and 
machine operator and assembler jobs (table 14). There are therefore two trends for 
employed whites in eThekwini: firstly, that the number of whites employed in highly-
skilled, high-income jobs are declining in both relative and absolute terms. Secondly, 
despite this absolute and relative decline, whites are over-represented in highly-
skilled, high-income jobs with the more than three-quarters of all employed whites 
working in managerial, professional, technical or associate professional occupations. 
Race 1980 1996 2001 2005 2010 2014 
Black African 78 38 42 61 62 73 
Coloured 1 4 5 4 1 3 
Indian or Asian 16 34 35 21 31 19 
White 6 23 18 14 6 4 
All Races 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Table 15: Relative employment in clerical support, services and sales workers by race, 
1980-2014  
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Figure 6: Employment in clerical support, and services and sales jobs by race, 1980-2014  
Table 16: Employment in white-collar, middle-income occupations by racial groups: 1996 
and 2014. 
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1996 2014 
Race 
Employment 
in white-
collar 
middle- 
Income Jobs 
% of 
employed 
in white-
collar 
middle- 
Income 
Total 
Employed 
Employed 
in white-
collar 
middle- 
Income 
% of 
employed 
Total 
Employed 
Black African 52,006 38 411,413 261,961 73 939,703 
Indian or Asian 46,299 34 206,451 69,572 19 219,449 
White 31,435 23 147,504 14,121 4 95,567 
Coloured 5,619 4 23,498 11,235 3 29,251 
All Races 135,359 100 794,081 356,889 100 1,283,970 
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The racial pattern of employment in clerical support, services and sales jobs 
(figure 6) shows that black Africans have accounted for the largest presence in this 
particular occupational grouping for the last several decades.  The absolute number 
of black Africans grew steadily from 1996 reaching a large pinnacle in 2014. The 
dramatic amount of growth from 1980 to 2014 was similar to the increasing number 
of black Africans in managerial, professional, associate professional and technical 
jobs; their presence in white-collar semi-skilled jobs is a testament to the increasing 
skills of the black African workforce (figure 26). The Indian population has had 
steady employment in white-collar middle-income jobs over that past two decades. 
While Indians and coloureds employed in white-collar, middle-income jobs have 
declined in relative terms, they have also experienced absolute growth. 
 
Figure 7: Employment in crafts and related trades workers or machine operators and 
assembler jobs by race, 1980 to 2014 
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Race 1980 1996 2001 2005 2010 2014 
Black African 49,745 95,410 104,418 176,249 185,542 219,146 
Coloured 1,403 6,739 6,871 12,632 4,088 4,345 
Indian or Asian 17,043 52,157 50,862 65,923 58,703 39,114 
White 2,199 14,452 11,350 23,269 9,322 4,796 
All Races 70,390 168,758 173,501 278,073 257,655 267,401 
Table 18: Employment in craft and related trades workers, and plant and machine operators 
and assemblers by race, 1980-2014 
Race 1980 1996 2001 2005 2010 2014 
Black African 71 57 60 63 72 82 
Coloured 2 4 4 5 2 2 
Indian or Asian 24 31 29 24 23 15 
White 3 9 7 8 4 2 
Table 19: Relative employment in craft and related trades workers, and plant and machine 
operators and assemblers by race, 1980-2014 
 
2005 2014 
Race 
Employment 
in blue-
collar 
middle- 
Income Jobs 
% of 
employed 
in blue-
collar 
middle- 
Income 
Total 
Employed 
Employed 
in blue-
collar 
middle- 
Income 
Jobs 
% of 
employed 
in blue-
collar 
middle- 
Income 
Total 
Employed 
Black African 176,249 63 637,493 219,146 82 939,703 
Indian or Asian 65,923 24 198,932 39,114 15 219,449 
White 23,269 8 149,900 4,796 2 95,567 
Coloured 12,632 5 50,910 4,345 2 29,251 
All Races 278,074 100 1,046,642 267,400 100 1,283,970 
Table 20: Employment numbers and percentages in blue-collar, middle-income occupations 
by racial groups: 2005 and 2014. 
As for the racial composition of the craft and related trades workers and plant and 
machine operators and assemblers group, it is a grouping that has also been 
dominated by black Africans, although there is also a modest group of employed 
Indian workers (figure 7).  This pattern could be seen to be similar to the one 
observed for clerical, services and sales workers but the crucial difference is that 
these blue-collar middle-income jobs have experienced considerably less growth. 
This is logical considering the overall decline of crafts, trade and machine operator 
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and assembler occupations discussed in chapter 3. That the growth of black Africans 
in clerical support and services and sales jobs has been greater than that which they 
experienced in craft and related trades workers and plant and machine operator and 
assembler jobs supports this argument. There is further evidence of the decline of 
this occupational group when looking at relative employment within the racial groups: 
while the absolute numbers of black Africans employed in semi-skilled, blue-collar 
jobs has increased, the relative share of the black African population employed in 
these jobs decreased from 34 percent in 1980 to 23 percent in 2014 (table 26). All 
other racial groups experienced both absolute and relative decline during this same 
period. 
Indian 
Employment by 
Occupation 
Absolute 
Employed 
1996 
Relative 
Employed 
1996 
Absolute 
Employed 
2014 
Relative 
Employed 
2014 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
1996-2014 
Highly-Skilled, 
High-Income 
Jobs 
50,846 32 96,166 44 
90,793- 
101,539 
White-Collar, 
Middle-Income 
Jobs 
46,299 29 69,572 32 
19,628 - 
26,918 
Blue-Collar, 
Middle-Income 
Jobs 
52,157 33 39,114 18 
15,228 - 
10,858 
Low-Skilled, 
Low-Income 
Jobs 
10,634 7 14,597 7 
3,553 - 
4,373 
Total Black 
African 
Employment 
159,936 100 219,449 100 
55,414 - 
63,612 
Table 21: Absolute changes in the occupational distribution of employed Indians, 1996 and 
2014 (Source: South African Population Census 1996 and Labour Force Survey 
2014) 
There is a similar trend in the Indian population employed in blue-collar semi-skilled 
jobs: steady growth until the mid-2000s, followed by a decline. These blue-collar, 
semi-skilled jobs aside, the combined number of Indians employed in both white-
collar semi-skilled work and in highly-skilled, high-income jobs account for the 
majority of employed Indians in the eThekwini area (table 21). This is evidence that 
Indians in eThekwini have managed to acquire the resources required by a 
workforce demanding an increasingly skilled workforce.  
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Table 22: Employment in elementary occupations by race, 1980-2014 
 
Figure 8: Employment in elementary occupations by race, 1980 to 2014 
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Race 1980 1996 2001 2005 2010 2014 
Black African 23,878 145,254 145,984 226,535 225,346 305,986 
Coloured 294 1,280 1,524 11,618 890 2,828 
Indian or Asian 2,814 10,634 13,120 12,534 11,417 14,597 
White 244 3,003 2,588 867 - 1,814 
All Races 27,230 160,171 163,216 251,554 237,653 325,225 
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Race 1980 1996 2001 2005 2010 2014 
Black African 88 90.7 89 90 95 94 
Coloured 1 6.6 1 5 0 1 
Indian or Asian 10 1.9 8 5 5 4 
White 1 0.8 2 0 0 1 
All Races 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Table 23: Relative employment in elementary occupations race, 1980-2014  
Table 24: Employment numbers and percentages in low-skilled, low-income occupations by 
racial groups: 1996 and 2014.4 
When lastly looking at the racial composition of elementary occupations, it is the 
occupational grouping most dominated by a single racial group. Since the 1980s, it 
has almost entirely been occupied by black Africans, with employment growing 
continuing to grow steadily over the decades to 2014. Black Africans have amounted 
for more than 90 percent of employment in elementary jobs consistently (as seen in 
1996 and 2014). As seen in table 24, the only racial group with large growth in 
absolute terms in elementary jobs from 1996 to 2014 are black Africans. My 
evidence thus shows that elementary occupations are the occupational group with 
the highest number of employed black Africans in the entire occupational structure 
(table 26). Many black African workers are still dependent on such low-income jobs 
for employment. This arguably shows that despite the growth in both highly-skilled, 
high-income occupations and semi-skilled, middle-income white-collar jobs, many 
                                                          
4 The 95% confidence interval for the absolute growth of black Africans in elementary jobs is 153,455 – 168 
019. 
 
1996 2014 
Race 
Employed 
in low- 
Income 
Jobs 
% of 
employed 
in low- 
Income 
jobs 
Total 
Employed 
Employed 
in low- 
Income 
Jobs 
% of 
employed 
in low- 
Income 
jobs 
Total 
Employed 
Black African 145,254 90.7 411,413 305,986 94 939,703 
Indian or Asian 10,634 6.6 206,451 14,597 4 219,449 
White 3,003 1.9 147,504 1,814 1 95,567 
Coloured 1,280 0.8 23,498 2,828 1 29,251 
All Races 160,977 100 794,081 325,225 100 1,283,970 
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black Africans still depend on low-skilled, low-income work and do not have the skills 
(or access to means to gain skills) to move beyond elementary work. The next 
question to address is the racial composition of the unemployed, and if black 
Africans also dominate the number of unemployed in a relative sense. 
Unemployment, inter-racial and growing intra-racial inequality: 
As discussed in chapter 3, in 2014 the unemployment rate in eThekwini was 16 
percent. That the unemployment rate is high asks a further question: what is the 
racial composition of the unemployed workforce? Logic would dictate that those 
racial groups that were disadvantaged under Apartheid would be greatest risk of 
unemployment as they would have had less time to gain a quality education and 
acquire the necessary skills demanded by an economy requiring more skilled jobs. 
This would certainly make sense in an urban environment which is undergoing 
professionalization, in which the pattern of employment growth is towards a high-skill 
economy, as is argued to be the case in Johannesburg (Crankshaw and Borel-
Saladin, 2014: 1860). Racial inequality is also argued to increase in occupational 
structures undergoing a polarised pattern of growth, as it is claimed that there are a 
disproportionate number of whites employed in highly-skilled, high-income jobs, 
while black Africans, Coloureds and Asians are disproportionately concentrated in 
low-skilled, low-income jobs (Baum, 1997: 1897; Lemanski, 2007:457; Sassen 1990, 
83-4; 1998, 46; 2001, 321). Due to the decline of semi-skilled employment in a 
polarising occupational structure, those who are not highly-skilled would be limited to 
the low-skill, low-income pool of jobs. The competition for low-skilled jobs from semi-
skilled workers, who are argued to be losing their jobs do to the decline in semi-
skilled work, along with low-skilled and unskilled workers could leave large numbers 
of these workers without access to jobs. However, as my evidence in chapter 3 
showed, eThekwini is not experiencing a polarisation or professionalization of its 
occupational structure; while there has been growth in both highly-skilled and low-
skilled jobs, my evidence suggests a continuous pattern of semi-skilled, middle-
income growth. With the fast growth of semi-skilled occupations, there is still 
potential for workers who are not highly-educated or highly-skilled to find 
employment in semi-skilled jobs: high-school dropouts could still find middle-income 
manual jobs, or the low-income equivalent.  
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Race Unemployed 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
% of all 
Unemployed 
Black African 
210,622 
201,852 - 
219,392 
85 
Indian or Asian 31,236 30,046 - 32,426 13 
White 1,212 1,202 - 1,222 0.5 
Coloured 6,147 6,037 - 6,257 2.5 
Total Unemployed 
249,217 
244,886 – 
253,548 
100 
Table 25: Racial composition of the unemployed workforce, 2014 
Race 
Absolute 
Employed 
1980 
Relative 
Employed 
1980 
Absolute 
Employed 
2014 
Relative 
Employed 
2014 
Absolute 
Change 
1980-
2014 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
1980-2014 
Highly-Skilled, 
High-Income Jobs 
10,985 8 152,611 16 141,626 
134,515 - 
148,736 
White-Collar, 
Middle-Income 
Jobs 
60,816 42 261,961 28 201,145 
190,153 - 
212,136 
Blue-Collar, 
Middle-Income 
Jobs 
49,745 34 219,146 23 169,401 
160,138 - 
178,664 
Low-Skilled, Low-
Income Jobs 
23,878 16 305,986 33 282,108 
274,821 - 
289,394 
Total Black African 
Employment 
145,424 100 939,704 100 794,280 
773,622 - 
814,936 
Table 26: Absolute changes in the occupational distribution of employed black Africans, 
1980 and 2014 (Source: South African Population Census 1980 and Labour Force 
Survey 2014) 
Despite the availability of semi-skilled and low-skilled jobs in eThekwini, my evidence 
shows that the racial composition of the unemployed is dominated by black Africans 
to a shocking extent. Black Africans are by far the largest group accounting for 
unemployment numbers as in 2014 they alone account for 85 percent of all 
unemployed workers (table 25). If the number of unemployed black Africans 
(249,217, table 25) were considered as an occupational group on their own, it would 
be a group similar in size to the number of black Africans employed in white-collar 
and blue-collar middle-income jobs. Notably, this would be larger than the number of 
black Africans employed in highly-skilled, high-income managerial, professional or 
technical jobs (table 26).  
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However, the high unemployment among black Africans asks questions of the ability 
of unemployed workers to find both jobs and the necessary resources to look for 
work. As discussed in chapter 3, an aspect of the professionalization argument is 
that with urban economies having an increasing demand for highly-skilled jobs, 
workers who do not have skills or the resources to gain those skills are forming part 
of a growing unemployed “outsider surplus population”. What is particularly 
interesting in the case of eThekwini is that there is still a large demand for 
elementary occupations which are low-skilled jobs, which is one of the occupational 
groups with highest number of employed black Africans. In the context of the debate 
about polarisation, Sassen argues that the large growth of low-skilled, low-income 
work in New York and Los Angeles is due to the high and continuous level of 
immigration bringing with it a large low-skilled immigrant labour supply 
(Sassen,1984: 140). Such logic could be applied to the case of the significant 
number of employed black Africans in eThekwini’s elementary occupations:  
eThekwini is the urban focal point of the Kwa-Zulu Natal province. As of such, it 
logically would be the destination of choice for many of the migrant workers who 
seek employment coming from the more rural parts of the province. However, 
Sassen argument makes the claim that the cause of the growth of low-skilled jobs in 
cities is large-scale immigration. Hamnett (1994) disagrees, and notes that while 
other global cities have large numbers of immigrants, Sassen bases her argument of 
the causes of growth in low-skilled employment in global cities on the levels of 
immigration experienced by New York and Los Angeles (Hamnett, 1994: 407-408). 
Hamnett argues that the proportions of immigration in those two cities are much 
higher than in others, and that growth in employment is related to economic, social 
and demographic factors of the contextual city. In the case of eThekwini, scholars 
have argued that the importance of unskilled and low-skilled manual work relates to 
the busy trading port in the city (Dubbeld, 2003; Freund, 2000: 147). The continued 
importance of elementary occupations in eThekwini could relate to its status as a 
port city, and the supply for those jobs could be provided by migrant labour.  
Referring back to the debate around the changing occupational structure, I can 
discuss the evidence presented in this chapter in relation to the arguments about 
polarisation, professionalization and their effects on racial inequality. Scholars who 
support the polarisation hypothesis, like Sassen (1990, 83-4; 1998, 46; 2001, 321) 
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and Lemanski (2007:457) argue that racial inequality is caused by several factors 
related to the polarisation of the occupational structure. Firstly, that a 
disproportionate number of blacks are concentrated in low-skilled, low-income jobs 
as opposed to high-income occupations which are dominated by whites.  Secondly, 
the decline of manufacturing employment and blue-collar jobs has deprived black 
Africans of access to middle-income jobs and which has led to a “significant 
socioeconomic polarization based on race” (Lemanski, 2007: 457). My evidence 
shows that high-income managerial, professional, technical and associate 
professional jobs have growing high numbers of employed black Africans and 
Indians alongside whites (table 12). This challenges the first argument made by 
proponents of the polarisation thesis as whites no longer dominate eThekwini’s 
highly-skilled, high-income jobs in absolute terms, despite the over-representation of 
whites in these jobs relative to their employment in other occupations. Regarding the 
second argument that deindustrialization has limited the access black Africans have 
to middle-income employment, I demonstrated in chapter 3 that there has been 
considerable growth of employment in semi-skilled, middle-income clerical support, 
services and sales jobs. Black Africans are highly represented in these white-collar 
jobs, alongside a smaller group of Indians, which is indicative of the social mobility of 
previously disadvantaged racial groups, not of their socioeconomic isolation in low-
skilled, low-income jobs (table 16). My results thus do not support the argument of 
social polarisation based on race, but is instead more consistent with arguments 
made by scholars who argue that there is significant educational, income and 
occupational differentiation among racial groups (Clark, 1998: 191; Clark and 
McNicholas, 1996: 61; Clark, 2003: 124; Hamnett, 2003: 115; Waldinger and 
Bozorgmehr, 1996:  26-27; Wilson, 2003: 1099). 
While I have considered the growth of all racial groups in both highly-skilled and 
semi-skilled jobs, to further investigate questions of inequality in regards to the 
inequality between racial groups, I must also look at the inequality within racial 
groups. In doing this, the question of unemployment and its racial composition 
comes into play. Despite the increasing number of black Africans employed in high 
and middle-income jobs, there remains a large number employed in low-skilled, low-
income work and high number of unemployed. High numbers of unemployed blacks 
is a feature discussed by proponents of the professionalization argument, who argue 
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that deindustrialization has resulted in higher rates of unemployment amongst low-
skilled workers than those who are better educated (Kasarda, 1989: 33; Kesteloot, 
1995: 211-14; Kesteloot, 2000: 199-201; Ortiz, 1996; Wilson, 1980; Wilson, 1987: 
39-41; Wilson, 1996: 30). As there is a growth of employment in, and thus demand 
for, jobs that require skills those who are unskilled are left at the mercy of an 
occupational structure where it is very difficult for them to find jobs, putting them at 
risk of unemployment.  In other South African studies of Cape Town and 
Johannesburg, this outsider surplus population has been argued to be dominated by 
black Africans (Crankshaw, 2008; 2012; Crankshaw and Borel-Saladin, 2014). 
My evidence has shown that the racial composition of the unemployed workforce is 
indeed almost entirely dominated by black Africans (table 25), which is in stark 
contrast to the increasing number of black Africans employed in middle class jobs 
(table 26). In regards to the polarisation debate, the evidence of black African 
mobility into middle-income jobs is contrary to what is argued by proponents of the 
polarisation thesis, like Lemanski, who argues that black Africans have been 
deprived of opportunities to middle income jobs. My evidence shows that black 
Africans and Indians are both highly-represented in white-collar and blue-collar 
middle-income jobs, which counters the claim of significant socioeconomic 
polarisation based on race (Lemanski, 2007: 457). It could be argued that the 
increasing number of black Africans in high-income and middle-income jobs is a sign 
of decreasing inter-racial inequality. However, this does not mean that inequality is 
declining racially. While my results show that there has been increased social 
mobility for black Africans and Indians into the middle-class, a large proportion of the 
black African population is either unemployed or working in low-income jobs. In 
comparison, the vast majority of whites are employed in high-income jobs, and have 
almost no representation in the low-income and unemployed classes (table 14). 
Indians, while not as highly-represented as black Africans in low-income work and 
the unemployed, still have larger proportions of their population represented in the 
unemployed and low-income class than whites (table 25). Relative to the high-
representation that black Africans have in these classes, there is still inequality 
between whites and other races.  
Secondly, greater social mobility for black Africans and access to higher-incomes 
has led to increasing intra-racial inequality. The experience of those black Africans 
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who account for large portion of highly-skilled, high-income jobs in 2014 will be the 
complete opposite of the almost a third of black Africans who are unemployed in the 
same year. Racial inequality has taken on an additional form, where it not merely 
present between different racial groups, but there is increasing inequality within 
racial groups, particularly between black Africans. Based on my evidence, I agree 
with an argument made by several scholars about the post-Apartheid racial and 
class structure in South Africa: the middle class is experiencing de-racialisation due 
to the mobility of previously disadvantaged racial groups; however the unskilled, low-
skilled and unemployed classes remain almost entirely comprised of black Africans, 
a persisting feature from the Apartheid-era. Except now, instead of simply having 
vast inter-racial inequality there is also increasing intra-racial inequality (Crankshaw, 
1997; Seekings and Nattrass, 2005).  
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Conclusion 
This study has examined the changes of eThekwini’s occupational class structure, 
firstly demonstrating that the City has experienced deindustrialisation by measuring 
the changes in employment of the different economic sectors. The manufacturing 
sector has declined, but relative to the deindustrialisation experienced by other major 
South African cities like Cape Town or Johannesburg, the decline of the 
manufacturing sector in eThekwini occurred later in the mid-2000s. I then tested 
arguments related to the effects of deindustrialisation of the occupational structure, 
particularly the social polarisation thesis, by studying the long-term trends in the 
occupational structure. My results demonstrate that employment in eThekwini has 
undergone a pattern of semi-skilled, middle-income growth. There was large relative 
and absolute growth in low-skilled, low-income and highly-skilled, high-income work 
from 1980-2014, but the absolute growth of all semi-skilled, middle-income 
occupations was the largest in the City’s occupational structure during this period. 
This result presents challenges to other arguments within the debate surrounding 
urban and occupational inequality: firstly to the argument that deindustrialisation 
results in occupational polarisation, as despite the growth of high-income and low-
income jobs the largest absolute growth of employment has been in middle-income 
occupations. Secondly, my results show that eThekwini is not experiencing a 
professionalising pattern either, as large growth of employment has not been 
exclusively dominated by highly-skilled, high-income jobs. Instead, there has been 
absolute and relative growth in all occupations. The pattern of large semi-skilled 
growth also had consequences for the unemployment rate: while there is high 
number of unemployed in eThekwini, the unemployment rate is lower than the 
national rate in South Africa or the rate experienced in Johannesburg. I have argued 
that this may be in relation to the growth of employment in low-skilled jobs alongside 
the large pattern of semi-skilled growth as there are more opportunities for work for 
unskilled, low-skilled and semi-skilled workers in eThekwini than in an urban context 
like Johannesburg which has experienced a professionalising pattern of employment 
growth. 
This study has also examined the relationship between eThekwini’s changing 
occupational structure and racial inequality. My results show that pattern of middle-
income growth in employment in the city has been accompanied by the de-
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racialisation of both semi-skilled, middle-income jobs and highly-skilled, high-income 
jobs. Black Africans have grown tremendously in terms of both absolute and relative 
employment in white-collar semi-skilled jobs and highly-skilled jobs, becoming the 
dominant employed racial group in these occupations.  I have argued that whites are 
persistently over-represented in highly-skilled jobs despite their declining numbers in 
total employment, but they no longer dominate those jobs in absolute terms. Both 
black Africans and Indians now have more numbers employed in highly-skilled, high-
income occupations than whites. The accompanying growth of black Africans and 
Indians in white-collar jobs is further evidence of the de-racialisation of the best-
paying jobs in the City. I thus argued that eThekwini is not experiencing 
socioeconomic polarisation based on race, as argued by Lemanski (2007). However, 
while the middle-class has deracialised, there is growing intra-racial inequality 
between black Africans as they almost entirely account for all employment in low-
skilled, low-income work. Glaringly too, my results show that black Africans account 
for vast majority of the unemployed in the City too. As the low-income working class 
and employed classes in the city are almost exclusively black, there is a stark 
contrast with the growing number of black Africans employed in skilled, well-paid 
jobs. The emerging pattern of intra-racial inequality is thus in line with arguments 
made by Crankshaw (1997) and Seekings and Nattrass (2005) about race and class 
in South Africa. Despite an occupational structure that is experiencing growth in both 
semi-skilled and low-skilled employment many black Africans cannot escape 
unemployment. 
Word Count: 18 286 
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Appendices: 
Sample Sizes 
As the Census data (1980, 1991, 1996 and 2001) are full population counts, there 
are no necessary samples. These are the sample sizes I used to calculate the 
standard errors and 95% confidence intervals. 
Income Calculations (Labour Market Dynamics Survey 2013) 
Basic ISCO Groups: 
Main occupation grouped Mean 
N, Sample 
Size 
Std. 
Deviation 
SE= √S2/n: 
=SQRT(S^2/n) 
Managers 8,906 589 15,564 641.30 
Professionals 7,609 394 8,341 420.22 
Technical and Associate professionals 7,121 772 19,014 684.34 
Clerical Support Workers 5,243 806 9,309 327.89 
Service and Sales Workers 4,645 837 18,062 624.32 
Craft and Related trades workers 3,951 657 8,021 312.94 
Plant and machine operators and assemblers 4,298 684 6,997 267.55 
Elementary Occupation 2671 1,570 7,186 181.35 
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers 1,572 7 1,010 381.79 
Main Occupations Grouped by Income: 
Main Occupations Grouped By Income Mean N 
Std. 
Deviation 
SE= √S2/n: 
=SQRT(S^2/n) 
Managers, Professionals, Technicians 7813 1,755 15,858 378.54 
Clerical, Sales and Services Workers 4931 1,643 14,552 359.02 
Skilled Agricultural, Forestry and Fisheries 1572 7 1,010 381.79 
Craft and Related Trades Workers and 
Machine Operators and Assemblers 
4129 1,341 7,517 205.27 
Elementary (Unskilled) Workers 2671 1,570 7,186 181.35 
Unweighted Employment by Economic Sector Values: 
Economic Sector 2005 2010 2014 
Agriculture, hunting, forestry 
and fishing 
6 10 9 
Mining and Quarrying 1 - - 
Manufacturing 151 271 236 
Electricity: gas and water 
supply 
7 2 6 
Construction 45 117 141 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 191 291 367 
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Transport 49 128 122 
Financial Services 94 242 243 
Community: social and 
personal services 
235 255 307 
Total Employment 779 1,316 1,431 
Unweighted Employment by Occupational Grouping Values: 
Main Occupations Grouped 2005 2010 2014 
Managers, professionals, 
technicians and associate 
professionals 
175 398 439 
Clerical Support workers and service 
and sales workers 
197 388 426 
Craft and related trades workers 
and plant and machine operators 
and assemblers 
207 328 318 
Elementary workers 197 328 377 
Total 776 1,442 1,560 
Unweighted Employment and Unemployment: 
Employment Status 2005 2010 2014 
Employed 783 1,446 1,560 
Unemployed 291 217 290 
Total Workforce 1,074 1,663 1,850 
 
Unweighted Employment and Unemployment by Race: 
All Races 
Employed 
2005 
Unemployed 
2005 
Employed 
2010 
Unemployed 
2010 
Employed 
2014 
Unemployed 
2014 
Black 
African 
452 222 923 158 1093 241 
Indian 198 56 388 54 303 38 
White 104 3 112 2 119 2 
Coloured 27 10 23 3 45 9 
 
Unweighted employment in highly-skilled, high-income occupations by race: 
All Races 2005 2010 2014 
Black African 43 151 194 
Indian 56 158 137 
White 65 82 92 
Coloured 9 7 16 
Total 173 398 439 
 
Unweighted employment in white-collar, semi-skilled, middle-income occupations by race: 
All Races 2005 2010 2014 
Black African 106 232 298 
71 
 
Indian 57 130 92 
White 27 19 19 
Coloured 7 7 17 
Total 197 388 426 
 
Unweighted employment in blue-collar, semi-skilled, middle-income occupations by race: 
All Races 2005 2010 2014 
Black African 124 233 246 
Indian 66 80 59 
White 10 9 6 
Coloured 7 6 7 
Total 207 328 318 
 
Unweighted employment in low-skilled, low-income occupations by race: 
All Races 2005 2010 2014 
Black African 176 306 355 
Indian 16 18 15 
White 1 - 2 
Coloured 4 2 5 
Total 197 326 377 
 
